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Abstract 
The overarching implications of the EU 2020 targets for Austria call for a fundamental restructuring of the Austrian energy 
sector towards increased energy efficiency. Two guiding principles for this restructuring are required in order to be compati-
ble with the targets for greenhouse gas emissions and renewables (RES) expected for Austria: final energy consumption 
needs to be stabilised at the levels of 2005; renewable energy sources need to be expanded at least by 40 percent. 
For the final negotiations on phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading System we propose contributions on three issues: 1. opera-
tional procedures for dealing with carbon leakage and competitiveness in all sectors that provide criteria for allocating free 
allowances: 2. empowering the carbon market by extending the task of the emissions allowances issuing carbon authority to 
control the liquidity of the carbon market in view of stabilising the carbon price; 3. designing the auctioning mechanism by 
considering timing and auctioning as a strategic instrument for enhancing the carbon market and considering unified auc-
tioning with revenues split among EU countries. 
Similarly we suggest for the final negotiations on the RES Directive improvements that overcome discrepancies between na-
tional RES targets and available resources for implementation. This requires in particular improved cooperation between EU 
countries for a better mapping of targets and potentials. 
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1 Executive Summary 
The ambitious EU 2020 
targets 
The EU 20 + 20 targets for greenhouse gas emissions and energy from 
renewable resources put forward for 2020 will fundamentally change the 
European economies: 
• Never before did the EU set such ambitious policy targets for such a 
long period. 
• These targets will require a profound restructuring of the EU energy 
system. 
• Momentous consequences of these targets can be expected on the 
rest of the world. 
The ambitious energy and climate package presented by the Commission 
on 23 January 2008 has a twofold motivation: increasing the security of 
energy supply and combating climate change. These driving forces re-
quire a deliberate transition towards a low carbon economy. 
 
The challenge for Austria The overall 2020 EU targets call for a 20% reduction of greenhouse gases 
(extended to 30% in case of an international climate policy agreement) 
compared to 1990 and a share of 20% renewables (from 8.5% currently).  
These targets translate into the following challenges for Austria compared 
to the situation in 2005: 
• With the installations subject to the EU Emissions Trading Systems 
(ETS sector) contributing to the 21% reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
• With the Non-ETS sector achieving a 16% reduction of greenhouse 
gas reductions. 
• With the renewable energy sources (RES) increasing their share in 
gross final energy consumption from 23.3% to 34%. 
 
Potential impacts for 
Austria 
Austria is both heavily affected by the Commission energy and climate 
package and far from a path that moves towards these ambitious policy 
targets. 
• Because of its high energy intensity the ETS sector is exceptionally 
exposed to carbon costs that impair competitiveness and create in-
centives for relocation outside of the EU ETS area. 
• Current trends of energy use in buildings and transport are still far 
from the substantial reductions needed for approaching the reduction 
target for the Non-ETS sector. 
• Although Austria ranks fourth among the EU-27 with its compara-
tively high share of renewables, because of the high increase of en-
ergy demand the renewables share is declining, in particular in elec-
tricity production. 
 
Scope of this synthesis 
report 
This synthesis report is aimed at making the main implications of the 
Commission energy and climate package visible and supporting the final 
negotiation process.  
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The key findings The overarching implications of the EU 2020 targets for Austria call for a 
fundamental restructuring of the Austrian energy sector towards increased 
energy efficiency. 
Two guiding principles for this restructuring are required in order to be 
compatible with the targets for greenhouse gas emissions and renewables 
expected for Austria: 
• Final energy consumption needs to be stabilised at the levels of 
2005. 
• Renewable energy sources need to be expanded at least by 40%. 
In accordance with these guiding principles we identify three areas of pol-
icy actions: 
• Supporting domestic policy actions 
• Extending the EU Emissions Trading System 
• Improving flexibility for renewable energy sources target fulfilment 
 
Supporting domestic 
policy actions 
 
Because of the contingency of the EU 2020 targets on a fundamental re-
structuring of the energy system all over Europe, supporting domestic ac-
tions deserve the same priority as shaping the final decisions on the policy 
targets or accompanying EU-wide measures: 
• Advancing energy efficiency  
by stimulating technological innovations in particular for transport, 
buildings and high-efficient cogeneration of heat and electricity. 
• Recycling of revenues from auctioning under the EU ETS  
adds additional leverage to technological change triggered by carbon 
constraints and thus could create an Austrian Carbon Trust. 
• Additional incentive mechanisms  
such as domestic emissions allowances. 
• Removal of non-economic barriers 
as simplified permission processes, infrastructural prerequisites and 
adequate system integration for distributed generation to allow an 
accelerated deployment of renewable energy in all Member States. 
 
Extending the EU ETS 
 
For the final negotiations on phase three of the EU Emissions Trading 
System we propose contributions on three issues: 
• Operational procedures for dealing with carbon leakage and competi-
tiveness in all sectors  
that provide criteria for allocating free allowances for 
- export competition on Non-ETS markets, 
- import competition from Non-ETS markets, 
- relocation competition for additional production capacities, 
and integrate benchmarking procedures. 
• Empowering the carbon market 
by extending the task of the emissions allowances issuing carbon au-
thority to control the liquidity of the carbon market in view of stabilis-
ing the carbon price. 
• Designing the auctioning mechanism 
by considering timing and auctioning as a strategic instrument for en-
hancing the carbon market and considering unified auctioning with 
revenues split among Member States. 
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Improving flexibility for 
RES target fulfilment 
Similarly we suggest for the final negotiations on the RES Directive im-
provements that overcome discrepancies between national RES targets 
and available resources for implementation. 
This requires in particular improved cooperation between Member States 
for a better mapping of targets and potentials. Of relevance in this respect 
are: 
• A transparent EU-wide platform  
to support cooperative actions between Member States. 
• Guidance on simplified common rules for joint projects  
to lower transaction costs. 
• A predetermined mechanism for target compliance  
to stimulate RES deployment all over Europe. 
• The establishment of minimum design criteria for RES support  
to assure efficient and effective RES deployment in all Member 
States. 
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2 The Commission energy and climate 
package of 23 January 2008 
 
2.1 The overall design 
 
Ambitious 2020 targets: 
- minus 20% GHG 
- 20% share of RES 
 
The European Council committed itself in 2007 to an ambitious reduction 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an increasing share of renew-
able energy sources (RES) in Europe.  
The unilateral target for the EU27 is a reduction of 20% GHG emissions 
until 2020 compared to 1990. In case of an international climate policy 
agreement this target will be extended to a 30% reduction.  
For renewable energy an increase of the share of RES in overall EU en-
ergy consumption from 8.5% today to 20% by 2020 was agreed. More-
over, the plan as endorsed by the European Heads of State in March 
2007 has also foreseen to achieve at least a 10% biofuels component in 
vehicle fuel by 2020.  
 
The motivation: 
- energy security 
- climate change 
- restructuring 
The motivation for this energy and climate package is threefold: 
• Energy security 
In a business as usual development of energy demand the EU is fac-
ing a constantly increasing import share in energy resources making 
the EU economy vulnerable to interruptions in international energy 
markets. 
• Climate change 
The irreversibility of climate change motivates the EU to take action 
in order to limit the risk of a temperature increase to less than 2 de-
grees by the end of this century (compared to pre-industrial levels). 
• Restructuring the economy towards a low carbon development path 
The implementation of the energy and climate package is supposed 
to set incentives for innovative technologies in all sectors of the 
economy targeted at less energy demand and less fossil fuel use. 
 
The key documents: 
- Effort Sharing 
- EU ETS 
- RES 
On 23 January 2008 the Commission published a climate and energy 
package comprising a number of policy proposals in order to reach the 
ambitious EU-wide targets.  
The key documents of this package are: 
• A proposal for effort sharing among EU Member States, 
COM(2008) 17, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the effort of Member States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas 
emission reduction commitments up to 2020. 
• A proposal to revise the EU Emissions Trading System,  
COM(2008) 16, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve 
and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system 
of the Community. 
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• A proposal to promote renewable energy, 
(COM(2008) 19, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from re-
newable sources. 
These key documents are accompanied by proposals on carbon capture 
and storage and guidelines for environmental state aid as well as by an 
impact assessment of the proposed policy package. 
 
A commitment for lead-
ership 
This energy and climate package of the EC underlines the leadership role 
of the EU in combating climate change. Its long-term targets set the 
framework for a structural change of the EU economy with the most pro-
nounced effects on the energy system.  
The ambitious targets for reducing GHG emissions and increasing the 
share of renewables in final energy consumption can only be met if Mem-
ber States are successful in improving energy efficiency substantially. 
This in turn requires technological and behavioural changes in all eco-
nomic sectors. The EU expects from these transformations sound eco-
nomic development in the long term as well as securing and improving the 
competitiveness of Europe. 
The aim is to bring the proposals into binding regulation until the end of 
2008. 
 
2.2 The GHG target 
 
2.2.1 The overall GHG target for 2020 
 
Commission proposals 
for GHG reduction target 
and reform of EU ETS 
The European Council committed itself in 2007 to an ambitious reduction 
of GHG emissions. 
For the design of the GHG policy up to 2020 the Commission presented in 
the energy and climate package a Proposal for a Decision of the Euro-
pean Parliament on the effort sharing (COM(2008) 17) and a Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament on extending the EU ETS. 
Both proposals outline a strategy how by 2020 a GHG reduction of 20% or 
even 30% compared to 1990 could be achieved. 
 
2020 emissions reduc-
tion targets compared to 
1990 
The unilateral target for the EU-27 is a reduction of 20% until 2020 com-
pared to 1990. In case of an international climate policy agreement this 
target will be extended to a 30% reduction.  
The corresponding emissions to the 20% reduction target are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
2020 emissions reduc-
tion targets compared to 
2005 
The overall EU unilateral target of a 20% reduction of GHG emissions un-
til 2020 refers to the year 1990 and is equivalent to a reduction of 14% 
compared to GHG emissions in 2005. In case of an international climate 
policy agreement, the EU target becomes more stringent with a 30% re-
duction compared to 1990 emissions levels, corresponding to a GHG 
emissions reduction of 24% compared to 2005.  
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Table 1: Overall EU GHG target for 2020 
1990 2020 2020/1990
Mt CO2e Mt CO2e %-Change
EU Total 5,616.5 4,493.2 -20.0%  
Source: European Commission and own calculations 
 
2.2.2 Split of GHG target between Non-ETS and ETS sectors 
 
ETS and Non-ETS reduc-
tion targets 
The overall GHG reduction target is divided between the sectors subject 
to the European Emissions Trading Scheme, the ETS sectors, and the 
remaining Non-ETS sectors. This split also reflects shared responsibilities. 
Approximately 40% of EU27 GHG emissions in 2005 originated from the 
ETS sectors, whereas the Non-ETS sectors were responsible for ap-
proximately 60%. 
According to the Commission proposal ETS sectors are to contribute 60% 
toward the overall GHG reduction target while Member States have the 
responsibility for the remaining 40% share in the Non-ETS sectors. 
Thus, for the ETS-sector the Commission proposes an overall reduction of 
21% compared to 2005. Thereby, a single EU wide cap is proposed for 
the ETS sector from 2013 onwards contrary to former trading periods 
where the caps were set at the national level. 
For the remaining Non-ETS sectors this means an overall reduction of 
14% compared to 2005. 
 
 Table 2 indicates what the split of the overall target means for distribution 
of emissions allowances for the ETS and Non-ETS sector. In addition 
small differences in relation to the numbers in the Commission proposal 
become visible because of updates in the databases. 
Figure 1 illustrates the split of the EU overall target between the ETS and 
Non-ETS sectors. 
 
 
Table 2: ETS and Non-ETS sector targets for 2020 
EC Proposal
2005 2020 2020/2005 2020/2005
Mt CO2e Mt CO2e %-Change %-Change
EU Total 5,182.3 4,493.2 -13.3% -14%
EU ETS 2,119.3 1,713.8 -19.1% -21%
EU Non-ETS 3,063.0 2,779.5 -9.3% -10%  
Source: European Commission and own calculations 
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Figure 1: Split of the overall GHG target to ETS and Non-ETS sectors 
Target:
-20% compared to 1990
-14% compared to 2005
EU ETS
-21% compared 
to 2005
non-ETS sectors 
-10% compared to 2005
27 Member State targets, stretching from -20% to +20%
 
Source: European Commission 
 
2.2.3 National targets for Non-ETS sectors 
 
Non-ETS sector targets 
differ considerably 
among Member States 
for the overall 10% re-
duction at EU-27 level 
At EU-27 level a 10% reduction of GHG emissions compared to 2005 lev-
els is proposed by the Commission for the Non-ETS sectors. The corre-
sponding individual national targets differ considerably among Member 
States and range from a reduction of 20% (compared to 2005) for Den-
mark, Ireland and Luxembourg to an increase of 20% for Bulgaria The 
differences in the relative emission targets take into account income levels 
per head and are intended to enable higher growth in lower-income coun-
tries.  
Table 3 lists the reduction targets referring to the Non-ETS sectors for all 
Member States. 
 
Responsibilities of Mem-
ber States 
The responsibility to achieve the proposed targets in the Non-ETS sectors 
lies with the individual Member States. For Austria the Commission pro-
posal states a reduction requirement of 16% resulting in allowed emis-
sions for the Non-ETS sectors of 49.8 Mill. t CO2e in 2020. 
The emission path in the Non-ETS sectors (as well as the ETS-sectors) is 
assumed to follow a linear path in order to reach the proposed targets in 
2020.  
Member states are allowed to use Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
credits up to a limit of 3% of 2005 emissions of the Non-ETS sectors. 
Emissions data and the use of credits must be reported each year. 
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Figure 2: Non-ETS sectors target for 2020 
2020 Targets for Non-ETS Sectors
Percentage Change from 2005
-30.0% -20.0% -10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0%
EU Total
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
 
Source: European Commission and own calculations 
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Table 3: Non-ETS sectors target for 2020 
2005
Mt CO2e Mt CO2e %-Change
EU Total 3,063.0 2,779.5 -9.3%
Austria 59.9 50.3 -16.0%
Belgium 87.0 73.9 -15.0%
Bulgaria 29.9 35.9 20.0%
Cyprus 4.8 4.6 -5.0%
Czech Republic 63.2 68.9 9.0%
Denmark 37.8 30.2 -20.0%
Estonia 6.7 7.4 11.0%
Finland 35.9 30.2 -16.0%
France 429.1 369.0 -14.0%
Germany 530.0 455.8 -14.0%
Greece 62.6 60.1 -4.0%
Hungary 54.0 59.4 10.0%
Ireland 48.0 38.4 -20.0%
Italy 352.0 306.2 -13.0%
Latvia 8.3 9.7 17.0%
Lithuania 16.1 18.5 15.0%
Luxembourg 10.7 8.5 -20.0%
Malta 1.5 1.5 5.0%
Netherlands 131.4 110.4 -16.0%
Poland 199.7 227.7 14.0%
Portugal 50.8 51.3 1.0%
Romania 81.2 96.6 19.0%
Slovakia 24.1 27.2 13.0%
Slovenia 11.7 12.2 4.0%
Spain 258.0 232.2 -10.0%
Sweden 47.5 39.4 -17.0%
United Kingdom 421.3 353.9 -16.0%
2020
 
Source: European Commission and own calculations 
 
2.2.4 The overall ETS emissions reduction target 
 
 A key element of the Commission energy and climate package is the pro-
posal for a revision of the EU Emission Trading System that has been in 
operation since January 2005. This revision accounts for lessons learnt in 
the first trading phase 2005-2007. 
 
21% reductions in 2020 
compared to 2005 
The overall emission reduction target for the ETS sectors amounts to 21% 
in 2020 compared to 2005 emissions in the trading sector. A major 
change compared to the first trading period 2005-2007 and the second 
trading period 2008-2012 is the proposed EU-wide cap from 2013 on in-
stead of national caps. 
Emission caps for the third trading period 2013-2020 are calculated by 
starting from average allocated allowances in the period 2008-2012. From 
this amount 1.74% is subtracted, determining the available allowances for 
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2013. The reduction factor of 1.74% is applied each year until 2020 ensur-
ing a linearly decreasing number of available allowances each year and 
resulting in a 21% reduction of emissions equalling approximately 1,715 
Mill t CO2e in 2020 in the ETS sector compared to 2.120 Mill t in 2005. 
For new entrants a reserve of 5% of the yearly amount of allowances is 
provided.  
 
Emissions cap for 2013 Thus the number of allowances to be distributed e.g. in the year 2013 is 
calculated by 
• starting with the average of allocated allowances in the period 2008-
2012, 
• subtracting 1.74% (linear reduction factor) and 
• subtracting 5% reserve for new entrants, 
• which yields the number of allowances to be distributed in 2013. 
Adjustments to this number of allowances available in 2013 are to be 
made for installations that were not included in the trading system in the 
first and/or second trading but will be covered from 2013 on. These ad-
justments would also need to be made for new sectors and new gases to 
be included in the trading system. 
 
ETS emissions path for  
phase 3 
Table 4 indicates the adjustment path of the overall ETS emissions cap 
over the third trading period. 
 
 
Table 4: ETS cap 2012-2030 
ETS Cap
Mt CO2e
2008-2012 2,011
2013 1,970
2014 1,931
2015 1,892
2016 1,854
2017 1,816
2018 1,780
2019 1,744
2020 1,714
Year
 
Source: European Commission and own calculations 
 
Allocation and use of 
allowances 
By 30 June 2010 the quantity of allowances for 2013 shall be published 
based on the Commission decisions on the national allocation plans for 
the second trading period 2008-2012. The installations will receive the 
allowances on a yearly basis by the end of February for the respective 
year. Installations have to surrender allowances for emissions of a certain 
year until 30 April of the following year. 
In this respect there are no changes to previous trading periods. Non-
used allowances are valid throughout the trading period and may also be 
banked for future trading periods. Likewise may non-used allowances of 
the second trading period be used in the third period from 2013 on. 
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2.2.5 Allocation of ETS allowances to sectors 
 
 The Directive proposal stresses that auctioning should be the dominating 
allocation method. Sectoral differences in particular with regards to the 
potential of carbon leakage are taken into account, however, by allocating 
to them free allowances. 
The current Directive proposal differentiates between three groups of sec-
tors: 
• Power sector 
with full auctioning from the beginning. 
• “Normal” sectors 
without potential carbon leakage and 80% free allocation at the be-
ginning reduced to zero in 2020. 
• “Exposed” sectors” 
with potential carbon leakage and up to 100% free allocation. 
The difference in allocation methods between sectors mirrors competi-
tiveness concerns of the Commission as well as well as preventing un-
wanted GHG shifts to countries outside the emission trading system. 
Figure 3 depicts the proposed allocation procedure to these sectors. 
 
 
Figure 3: ETS sector allocations 
Available allowances
Sectors without 
potential 
carbon leakage
Sectors with potential
carbon leakage Power sector
Share according to 
proportion in
verified emission 2005-07 
Share according to 
proportion in
verified emission 2005-07
Share according to 
proportion in
verified emission 2005-07
In 2013: 80% free allocation
20% auctioning
over time: increasing share
of auctioning with 100%auctioning in 2020
Up to 100% free allocation
or carbon eqaulisation,
depending  on potential 
For carbon leakage
100% auctioning from 
2013 on
10% of allowances to be auctioned
redistributed to member states with
low income per head
Transitional free allocation according
to EU-wide rules – „benchmarking“
 
Source: Based on Commission proposal  
 
Carbon leakage and 
competitiveness 
The analysis and identification of sectors or sub-sectors prone to carbon 
leakage or adverse competitiveness effects should be completed by 30 
June 2011. Those sectors or sub-sectors may receive up to 100% free 
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allowances or would be prevented from negative competitiveness effects 
through a carbon equalisation system. This carbon equalization system 
referred to in the Directive proposal however is not yet specified. 
The underlying measure for competitiveness disadvantages is seen in an 
increase in costs due to allowance prices that cannot be passed on in 
prices and that will lead to a significant loss in market shares. Carbon 
leakage will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent section 3.2. 
 
No free allocations for 
power and heat 
The power sector is the only sector subject to full auctioning from 2013 on 
as it is assumed that any cost increases due to emissions trading can be 
passed on in prices. Exceptions are foreseen for electricity producers that 
also produce heat with efficient cogeneration technologies. 
 
Transitional free alloca-
tions for other sectors 
Transitional free allocation as well as free allocation for sectors or sub-
sectors with the risk of adverse competitiveness effects should follow 
community-wide harmonized rules. This should guarantee a level playing 
field for all installations within the ETS. 
 
2.2.6 ETS auctioning procedures 
 
Auctioning rules Although the Directive proposal does not specify the rules for the auction-
ing procedure it refers to a community regulation to be adopted by 31 De-
cember 2010 on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning.  
 
Auctioning revenues The Directive proposal states that auctioning revenues will accrue to 
Member States and that at least 20% shall be used for measures to re-
duce GHG emissions, adaptation measures in developing and least de-
veloped countries or for social aspects for low and middle income house-
holds. 
 
Redistribution of auc-
tioning rights 
90% of the total quantity of allowances to be auctioned is going to be dis-
tributed among the Member States according to their share in verified 
emissions of the EU ETS in 2005. The remaining 10% of auctioning rights 
are redistributed to consider solidarity and growth: Member States with an 
average level of GDP per capita of more than 120% of the EU average 
will contribute to this distribution, when direct costs of the overall energy 
and climate package in these countries do not exceed 0.7% of GDP.  
Table 5 informs how Member States are affected by the redistribution of 
the auctioning rights. 
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Table 5: Redistribution of auctioning rights 
redistributed
share
of 90% of 2005 
emissions
effective
share
of 2005 
emissions
Austria 0% 90%
Belgium 10% 99%
Bulgaria 53% 138%
Cyprus 20% 108%
Czech Republic 31% 118%
Denmark 0% 90%
Estonia 42% 128%
Finland 0% 90%
France 0% 90%
Germany 0% 90%
Greece 17% 105%
Hungary 28% 115%
Ireland 0% 90%
Italy 2% 92%
Latvia 56% 140%
Lithuania 46% 131%
Luxembourg 10% 99%
Malta 23% 111%
Netherlands 0% 90%
Poland 39% 125%
Portugal 16% 104%
Romania 53% 138%
Slovakia 41% 127%
Slovenia 20% 108%
Spain 13% 102%
Sweden 10% 99%
United Kingdom 0% 90%
Auctioning rights
 
Source: European Commission and own calculations 
 
Small installations Experience from the first trading period shows that a large number of 
small installations is included in the ETS that account only for a small 
share on total GHG emissions. Member States are allowed to exclude 
small installations from the ETS if measures are in place to monitor those 
emissions and to ensure that equivalent emissions reductions will take 
place.  
An installation is considered small if it has a rated thermal input of less 
than 25 MW and emissions of less than 10.000 t of CO2e. On the one 
hand the exclusion of small installations could reduce transaction costs 
from trading for these installations. On the other hand Member States 
would be responsible for regulatory measures that would result in emis-
sion reductions in line with the emission path of the EU ETS. 
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2.3 The RES target 
 
Commission proposal for 
a RES Directive  
To achieve the renewable energy policy goals, the Commission has pro-
posed a Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources (RES) (COM(2008) 19) as integral part of the climate and energy 
package of 23 January 2008. This aims to establish binding national re-
newable energy targets that result in an overall EU-wide target of a 20% 
RES share in energy consumption in 2020 and a binding 10% minimum 
target for RES in transport to be achieved by each Member State.  
 
Target definition and 
calculation of national 
targets 
The overall target of achieving a share of 20% RES by 2020 refers to “fi-
nal” energy consumption, which in contrast to the commonly applied sta-
tistical definition includes electricity and heat distribution and transmission 
losses as well as own consumption of the energy branch.  
Following the Directive proposal the EU target is allocated to differentiated 
national targets based on a flat rate approach (same additional share for 
each country) modulated by the Member State’s GDP. 
For an explanation and discussion of both we refer to the subsequent sec-
tions 2.3.1 (target definition) and 2.3.2 (calculation of national targets), 
respectively. 
 
Flexibility for Member 
States to implement the 
RES Directive 
All three energy sectors are implicated by RES: electricity, heating & cool-
ing and transport. The decision on the mix of contributions from these sec-
tors to reach their binding national targets is left to the Member States.  
Additionally, sufficient flexibility is intended to be ensured for Member 
States to implement the Directive in the way that suits their particular na-
tional circumstances best. Consequently, this comprises that Member 
States are free to decide on appropriate domestic RES support, choosing 
the means that best suits their national circumstances. Moreover, as na-
tional targets are defined in a way that does not explicitly reflect the na-
tional resource availability, the proposal aims to provide an option for 
Member States of achieving their targets by supporting the development 
of renewable energy in other Member States as well as third countries. 
The proposed flexibility measures to better map targets and potentials 
have been heavily debated and the current status of this discussion is 
summarized in section 2.3.3. 
 
10% share of biofuel 
(renewable transport) 
According to the Commission proposal, the minimum 10% share of biofu-
els or, more precisely, renewable energies in transport is applicable in all 
Member States. In order to tackle the oil dependence of the transport sec-
tor, which is one of the most serious issues affecting security of energy 
supply that the EU faces, an accelerated biofuel deployment is seen as 
appropriate tool.  
The 10% target for renewable energies in transport has been set at the 
same level for each Member State in order to ensure consistency in 
transport fuel specifications and availability. It is expected that Member 
States which do not have the relevant resources to produce biofuels will 
be able to obtain renewable transport fuels from elsewhere. While it would 
technically be possible for the European Union to meet its biofuel needs 
solely from domestic production, it is both likely and desirable that these 
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needs will in fact be met through a combination of domestic EU production 
and imports from third countries.  
Concerns have been raised about whether biofuel production is sustain-
able. The Directive therefore defines environmental sustainability criteria 
to ensure that biofuels that are to count towards the European targets are 
sustainable and that they are not in conflict with our overall environmental 
goals. This means that accounted biofuels must achieve at least a mini-
mum level of GHG savings and respect a number of requirements related 
to biodiversity. This aims to prevent the use of land with high biodiversity 
value, such as natural forests and protected areas, being used for the 
production of raw materials for biofuels. 
The negotiation process of the RES Directive is overshadowed by a de-
bate whether this 10% target is too ambitious or not. Criticism was raised 
on the (non-)sustainability of an accelerated biofuel deployment taking 
into accounted observable or expectable side-effects (e.g. increasing food 
prices, land use changes and correspondingly low or even negative GHG 
savings for biofuels). 
 
Removal of barriers for 
an accelerated RES de-
ployment 
The RES Directive also aims to remove unnecessary barriers for an ac-
celerated RES deployment – for example by simplifying administrative 
procedures, by improving grid access and by fostering the development of 
infrastructural prerequisites for new RES projects. 
 
 
2.3.1 Target definition 
Target definition used 
Target definition – 20% 
RES in terms of (gross) 
final energy 
The RES Directive establishes a novel definition with regard to the overall 
RES target. The targeted share of 20% RES by 2020 refers to “gross fi-
nal” energy consumption, which in contrast to the commonly applied sta-
tistical definition of final energy includes for electricity and heat distribution 
and transmission losses as well as own consumption of the energy 
branch. As such, the definition is closer to the concept of “secondary” en-
ergy. 
The exact formula for the overall national shares for renewable energy is 
defined as follows: 
nconsumptioenergyfinalGross
transportRESheatRESyelectricitRESofproductionGross
   
      ++  
The national RES targets using the above way of calculation would also 
include any imported renewable energy, which would be considered 
equivalent to domestic production when accredited e.g. by a Guarantee of 
Origin (GO).  
 
Normalisation of hydro-
power generation 
In order to avoid distortions due to hydrology variations, the contribution of 
hydropower to RES has to be normalised, whereby the normalised hydro 
production is calculated on the basis of the installed capacity (excluding 
capacity for pumping) and the average load factor over the last 15 years. 
 
Calculation of the Aus-
trian RES target 
Table 6 indicates the steps needed for calculating the RES targets and 
demonstrates how this target is obtained for Austria. 
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Table 6: Calculation of the RES target for Austria 
Austria
ktoe PJ TWh
Renewables Heat Target
Industry
Total Final Energy Consumption in Industry 8,825 369 103
Electricity Consumption in Industry 2,082 87 24
Heat Consumption in Industry 6,743 282 78
Final Energy Consumption of RE in industry 701 29 8
Share of RE for Heat in Industry 10.4% 10.4% 10.4%
Other Sectors
Total Final Energy Consumption in Households, Serv 10,489 439 122
Electricity Consumption in Households, Services, etc. 2,536 106 29
Heat Consumption in Households, Services, etc. 7,953 333 92
Final Energy Consumption of RE in Households, Services 1,982 83 23
Share of RE for Heating in Households, Services, etc. 24.9% 24.9% 24.9%
Industry and Other Sectors
Total Final Energy Consumption 19,314 809 225
Total Electricity Consumption 4,618 193 54
Heat Consumption in Industry and Other Sectors 14,696 615 171
Total RE input for heat in industry and Other Sectors 2,683 112 31
Derived heat consumption of RE origin (CHP and Heat pl 321 13 4
Share of renewables to total final heat needs 20.4% 20.4% 20.4%
Renewables Electricity Target
Hydro installed capacity in MW 11,811 11,811 11,811
Hydro installed capacity excluding pumping in MW 8,231 8,231 8,231
Actual hydro generation (excl. pumping) 3,085 129 36
Normalised hydro generation (excluding pumping) 3,190 134 37
Total gross electricity consumption 5,880 246 68
Electricity generation from RE with actual hydro generatio 3,403 142 40
Electricity generation from RE with normalised hydro gen 3,509 147 41
Electricity generation from RE without hydro generation 318 13 4
RE-e to total gross electricity consumption 57.9% 57.9% 57.9%
RE-e with normalised hydro (15 year average load fac 59.7% 59.7% 59.7%
Biofuels Target
Total final consumption of petrol and diesel for transport 6,995 293 81
Consumption of biofuels for transport 85 4 1
Share of biofuels in petrol and diesel consumption fo 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
Overall Target
Total Final Energy Consumption 27,308 1,143 318
Distribution losses for electricity 295 12 3
Distribution losses for heat 110 5 1
Consumption of electricity in the electricity/heat generatio 307 13 4
Consumption of heat in the electricity/heat generation sec 0 0 0
RE Heat 3,004 126 35
RE Electricity actual hydro 3,403 142 40
RE Electricity normalized hydro 3,509 147 41
RE Transport 85 4 1
RE with actual hydro 6,492 272 76
RE with normalized hydro 6,598 276 77
Excluding Losses and Own Consumption
Share of RE to Final Energy Consumption 23.8% 23.8% 23.8%
Share of RE to FEC with normalised for hydro 24.2% 24.2% 24.2%
Including Losses and Own Consumption
Share of RE to Final Energy Consumption 23.2% 23.2% 23.2%
Share of RE to FEC with normalised for hydro 23.5% 23.5% 23.5%
2005
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations 
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Target definition assessed 
Assessed options for 
target definition 
As stated in the Annex to the Impact Assessment (SEC(2008) 85, Vol. II) 
of the energy and climate package, besides the selected approach sev-
eral alternative options for target accounting have been investigated. The 
assessed options comprise: 
• Primary energy consumption according to the Eurostat method: 
A RES target could be defined in terms of primary energy following 
the Eurostat method. In general, primary energy is defined as the first 
commodity or raw material for which multiple energy uses are practi-
cal. Thus, primary energy measures energy inputs to conversion 
processes such as electricity generation. According to this statistical 
accounting approach for non-thermal renewable energy sources such 
as wind energy, hydropower or photovoltaic power the arbitrary as-
sumption is made that the energy input is equal to the energy output, 
whilst in case of nuclear power a hypothetical conversion efficiency of 
33% is preconditioned. The current 12% target for the share of re-
newable energy in 2010 is based on this definition. 
• Primary energy consumption following the substitution principle: 
Under the substitution method, non-thermal electricity (hydro, wind, 
tide/wave, photovoltaic) is valued in terms of the fuel input required 
by a hypothetical conventional thermal power plant. The other energy 
sources are valued in the same way as in the Eurostat method. 
• Final energy consumption: 
In general, final energy consumption is defined as the energy com-
modities delivered to final consumers for energy purposes. Obvi-
ously, it is lower than primary energy because it is measured after 
“losses” in producing derived energy commodities (transformation 
losses in heat and power stations); but as gross final energy con-
sumption, it is measured before losses in transmission and distribu-
tion and includes self-consumption of the electricity and heat 
ndustry. 
Directive 2001/77/EC defines national objectives for the RES share in 
electricity consumption in 2010. These are defined as the national 
production/import of electricity from renewable energy sources di-
vided by the gross national electricity consumption (i.e. the final con-
sumption before transmission and distribution losses and the self-
consumption of the energy sector). 
 
Concluding remarks 
Accounting based on 
(gross) final energy con-
sumption as preferable 
option 
The conclusions on the assessment of different target accounting ap-
proaches as drawn in the Annex to the Impact Assessment (SEC(2008) 
85, Vol. II) offer a sound depiction: Summing up, a pure final energy con-
sumption method overcomes the main disadvantages of accounting vari-
ants based on primary energy consumption, where the Eurostat method 
would lead to a discrimination between different types of renewable en-
ergy (i.e. biomass would account more than wind, solar or hydro) and 
cause an increase of the weighting of thermal and nuclear energy, whilst 
the substitution method puts reliance on a hypothetical reference case.  
Additionally, with the proposed adapted definition of final energy, the main 
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disadvantage of a pure definition based on final energy consumption – i.e. 
the fact that energy efficiency improvements in energy transformation 
would not be taken into account – is overcome, and consistency is main-
tained with the accounting methods used under existing legislation (Direc-
tives 2001/77 and 2003/30). 
 
Figure 4: RES targets for 2020 compared to 2005 
2020 Targets for Renewables
Share of Gross Final Energy Consumption
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0%
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
 
Source: Based on European Commission (COM(2008) 19) 
 
2.3.2 Calculation of national RES targets 
 
 The Commission faced a tough challenge when drafting the proposed 
RES Directive in early 2008 by ensuring efficient use of the RES re-
sources available across Europe; and by allocating the burden in a fair 
manner across Member States. 
Applied calculation 
The applied calculation 
of national RES targets 
The Commission decided to put forward a simple five-step approach for 
the latter part: 
• The share of renewable energy in 2005, forming the base year for all 
calculations in the package, is modulated to reflect national starting 
points and efforts already made by Member States achieving an in-
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crease of above 2% between 2001 and 2005 (Following this defini-
tion, early actions were acknowledged by one third of the overall 
achieved progress for several Member States, namely the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Romania and Sweden). 
• 5.5% is added to the modulated 2005 share of renewable energy for 
each Member State. 
• The remaining effort (i.e. 0.16 toe for each person in the EU) is 
weighted by a GDP/capita index to reflect different levels of economic 
wealth across Member States, then multiplied by each Member 
State’s population. 
• These two elements are added together to derive the full renewable 
energy share of total final energy consumption in 2020. 
• Lastly, the targets were capped to ensure that no Member State has 
a renewable energy share of 50% or more and rounded down from 
half a percentage point. (The introduction of the 50% cap affected 
solely Sweden, which otherwise would have been facing a target of 
50% instead of 49%). 
The resulting RES targets are listed in Table 7 which offers also a com-
parison with current RES shares (as of 2005). Additionally, Figure 4 offers 
a graphical illustration of the required increase of RES deployment. 
Such an approach of target allocation does not reflect the resource avail-
ability of the countries and therefore does not allow for a least cost exploi-
tation of the European RES potentials. Therefore several flexibility meas-
ures to better map targets and potentials have been heavily discussed. 
The subsequent section aims to summarize this debate, whilst chapter 4 
of this report offers a concise assessment of the resulting key options. 
Assessed options 
Assessed options for 
national target allocation 
In 2007 the Council of the European Union requested that the national 
RES targets should be set "with a view to sharing efforts and benefits 
fairly and equitably among all Member States, taking into account different 
national circumstances, starting points and potentials".  
According to the Annex to the Impact Assessment (SEC(2008) 85, Vol. II) 
of the energy and climate package two options for the national allocation 
of the overall target of 20% RES by 2020 have been assessed: The se-
lected flat-rate/GDP approach and, alternatively, a sharing on the basis of 
Member States' national resource potential and the corresponding cost.  
In general, it was observed that a setting of national targets based on re-
source potential leads to lower costs, whilst the approach based on a flat 
rate/GDP weighting could cause a fairer distribution of the costs, and, 
hence, appeared as the more feasible approach. Thus, for mitigating the 
higher costs of the flat rate/GDP approach flexibility mechanisms for RES 
target fulfilment would be required to stimulate cooperation between 
Member States. 
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Table 7: RES target for 2020 
Actual
2005
Target
2020
Austria 23.3% 34%
Belgium 2.2% 13%
Bulgaria 9.4% 16%
Cyprus 2.9% 13%
Czech Republic 6.1% 13%
Denmark 17.0% 30%
Estonia 18.0% 25%
Finland 28.5% 38%
France 10.3% 23%
Germany 5.8% 18%
Greece 6.9% 18%
Hungary 4.3% 13%
Ireland 3.1% 16%
Italy 5.2% 17%
Latvia 34.9% 42%
Lithuania 15.0% 23%
Luxembourg 0.9% 11%
Malta 0.0% 10%
Netherlands 2.4% 14%
Poland 7.2% 15%
Portugal 20.5% 31%
Romania 17.8% 24%
Slovakia 6.7% 14%
Slovenia 16.0% 25%
Spain 8.7% 20%
Sweden 39.8% 49%
United Kingdom 1.3% 15%
Share of RES
in Gross Final Consumption
of energy
 
Source: European Commission (COM(2008) 19) 
 
Concluding remarks 
– A challenging goal for 
Austria which puts 
 emphasis also on energy 
efficiency 
As illustrated in Table 7, Austria faces a RES target of 34% for 2020, 
which corresponds to an increase by 11 percentage points compared to 
the 2005 RES share of 23% which is in line with that of other Member 
States. Obviously, strong efforts are needed to achieve this ambitious tar-
get. This refers to both the supply side – i.e. a stable policy framework 
that defines effective and efficient RES support to achieve the accelerated 
RES deployment – and the demand side – i.e. the central role of energy 
efficiency to slow down or even inverse in the long term the past trend of 
growing energy demand.  
The importance of an effective energy efficiency policy is especially em-
phasized also by Austria’s high current RES share: The historic record 
has shown a rapid decline of the RES share on Austria’s electricity de-
mand, although deployment in absolute terms increased in recent years. 
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This was caused by a continuous demand growth in recent years. Conse-
quently, if this trend would continue, a national fulfilment of Austria’s RES 
target for 2020 would require major efforts to be taken and possibly go 
beyond practical realisation constraints. 
As discussed in (Nakicenovic, Schleicher et al., 2007) Austria’s realisable 
RES potential for 2020 is in range of 437 to 513 PJ, compared to 311 PJ 
RES as of today. These figures as expressed in terms of primary energy 
are derived from a comparison of eight different studies assessing in de-
tail Austria’s renewable resources, whereby the lower value appears more 
likely to be realised considering current economic and institutional con-
straints. Consequently, this illustrates that an increase by about half of 
current RES exploitation would allow for meeting Austria’s 2020 RES tar-
get only if also energy demand would be stabilised. 
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2.3.3 Discussion on flexibility mechanism for RES target fulfilment 
 
The Commission pro-
posal: Trade between 
Member States and pri-
vate parties 
In principle, the proposed RES directive would allow for two approaches, 
aiming simultaneously to achieve both an efficient use of resources and a 
fair burden-sharing. The Directive proposal intends that Member States 
can: 
• trade their surplus or deficit of renewable generation at a government 
level; and/or 
• allow market participants to use a certain share of renewables, but 
can also give market participants the flexibility to trade with other 
Member States (and it is made explicit that a virtual trade may take 
place independently of physical trade of the produced energy). 
The basic unit defined by the proposed directive is a Guarantee of Origin 
(GO). This unit would be generated for every MWh of electricity and heat 
produced from a renewable generator, whereby the inclusion of heating 
(and cooling) into the GO-scheme is limited to plants with a capacity of at 
least 5 MWth. 
The proposed two main approaches available for dealing with these GOs 
as sketched above are: 
• Trade between Member States 
To enable governments to trade with each other, they first have to be 
the ‘owner’ of the tradable value of the renewable energy delivered 
within their country. This is ensured by Article 8(1)(a) of the proposed 
Directive, which requires that the “guarantee of origin … shall be 
submitted for cancellation” in the Member State where it “receives 
support in the form of feed-in tariff payments, premium payments, tax 
reductions or payments resulting from calls for tenders”. 
• Trade between private parties 
The proposed Directive also offers a framework which would enable 
private parties to trade at installation level. According to its Article 
8(1)(b), GOs “shall be submitted for cancellation … [in the Member 
State where it] … is taken into account for the purposes of assessing 
an entity’s compliance with a renewable energy obligation”. Thus, an 
RES producer could produce renewable energy in one Member State 
and transfer the GO to a second Member State, provided that the in-
stallation became operational after the Directive had entered into 
force (Article 9(3)). 
 
Concern with respect to 
trade between private 
parties: Undermining 
domestic RES support 
In prior to the release of the RES Directive proposal Member States have 
voiced concern that domestic policies designed to support RES could be 
undermined by the possibility that private parties could trade such GOs at 
the project level (see e.g. (Johnson et al., 2008)). For example, most feed-
in tariff systems offer funding which is differentiated according to technol-
ogy and sometimes also according to the resource availability at a specific 
site. On account of this lower-cost RES technology options or RES plants 
with better available resources would receive less support under their do-
mestic scheme. The investors might instead avoid all domestic support 
schemes and directly sell the GOs in another Member State that offers a 
higher price. This possibility would undermine the ability of Member States 
to implement technology and resource-differentiated RES support 
schemes, which are intended to support a technology portfolio and avoid 
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high(er) consumer costs. 
 
“Prior authorisation” for 
the transfer of GOs to 
insulate domestic RES 
support 
As briefly argued in (Johnson et al., 2008), to address these concerns, 
under the proposed Directive “Member States may provide for a system of 
prior authorisation of the transfer of guarantees of origin to persons in 
other Member States if [otherwise] it is likely to impair their ability to com-
ply with [their renewable target or the] indicative trajectory” (Article 9(2)). A 
further justification for the imposition by a Member State of such prior au-
thorisation for imports and exports of GOs is “if [otherwise] it is likely to 
impair their ability to ensure a secure and balanced energy supply … [or] 
the achievement of the environmental objectives underlying their support 
scheme” (Article 9(2)). 
Consequently, the proposed Directive would allow Member States to im-
plement and insulate their domestic RES support scheme, and instead to 
pursue the trading of GOs at the government level. However, it is also 
clear that the proposals would require Member States to justify exactly 
why and how far such ‘insulation’ of their domestic scheme was required, 
on the basis of the specific criteria laid down in Article 9(2). Thus, it re-
mains an open question whether the measures given in Article 9(2) are 
sufficient effectively to protect the domestic support system against pri-
vate trade of GOs. 
 
Joint proposal by Ger-
many, Poland and the 
United Kingdom on an 
alternative renewable 
flexibility mechanism as 
accepted basis for fur-
ther negotiations 
Since the release of the RES Directive proposal the debate on potential 
unintended consequences of the proposed flexibility regime based on 
Guarantee of Origin trading continued. Concerns as raised by Member 
States in prior to the release and discussed above were not sufficiently 
allayed with the Directive proposal. As stated in the explanatory note for 
the Germany/Poland/ UK (DE/PL/UK, 2008b) flexibility proposal these 
concerns comprise: 
• Legal robustness of the ‘prior-authorisation’ clause with a risk that 
Member States may not be able to retain control of the trade in GOs, 
which may consequently undermine the integrity of national support 
systems. 
• Uncontrolled flow of GOs from one Member State to another might 
undermine its effort to fulfil its national RES target. 
• The administrative costs of the Guarantee of Origin scheme. 
• Guarantee of Origins would have three distinct functions – for disclo-
sure, for target compliance, and for proving entitlement to support. 
Such an administratively complex system may lead to confusion. 
• Member States cannot transfer GOs unless they have exceeded their 
interim trajectory. This means that Member States cannot trade early 
on in the compliance period, which makes it hard for Member States 
to plan effectively how they will meet their targets. 
Intending to solve the problems addressed above, Germany, Poland and 
the UK proposed a new flexibility scheme, which does not rely on GO- 
trading (DE/PL/UK, 2008a). The key features of this flexibility system are: 
• No use of certificates for target compliance purposes. 
• All flexibility would be directly under Member State control. 
• Flexibility could take the form of:  
− statistical transfers between Member States 
− project-based agreements between two or more Member State 
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governments for an operator to build a renewable installation in 
one Member State, and for the renewable energy generated by 
this project to count towards another Member State’s share of 
the target 
− two or more Member States combining their targets or support 
schemes 
This joint proposal was welcomed by Member States as well as by the 
European Commission and, as agreed on the informal meetings of EU’s 
environment and energy ministers in early July 2008, this currently forms 
the basis for further negotiations. 
 
 
2.4 The interdependencies of both targets 
 
2.4.1 The joint dependency of the targets on energy efficiency 
 
 Two important features of the GHG and the RES 2020 targets that make 
them intimately dependent need to be taken account: 
• Their joint dependencies via the underlying energy flows and  
• the particular definition of the RES target via its link to gross final en-
ergy consumption. 
The amount of energy flows in the energy system obviously has an impact 
on the amount of GHG emissions and the amount of renewables needed 
to fulfil a certain share. Lower energy flows because of higher energy effi-
ciency will both make it easier to fulfil the GHG and the RES target. 
This leverage effect is even more pronounced for the RES target since it 
is defined as the share of renewable energy in gross final energy con-
sumption. 
Thus energy efficiency is in all stages of the energy system the key driver 
for meeting the EU 2020 targets, put differently, the two 2020 targets im-
plicitly create incentives for improving energy efficiency. 
 
 
2.4.2 Evidence of this dependency for Austria 
 
A model based analysis 
for Austria 
In a model based analysis this joint dependency of the GHG and the RES 
target from gross final energy consumption can be analysed in more de-
tail. The basic findings for Austria are summarized in Figure 5 which re-
ports two reference scenarios developed with the GAIN modelling frame-
work. 
Starting with 2005 we normalize energy flows such that gross final energy 
consumption in that year is an index with value 100. Then the correspond-
ing amounts for fossil energy are 77 and for renewables 23, identical with 
their shares in gross final energy consumption. 
We make now the assumption, that the amount of renewable energy 
sources can be increased by 45% in 2020 which brings renewables to the 
index value 34. 
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A Business-as-Usual sce-
nario 
One scenario for 2020 could be a Business-as-Usual (2020 BaU) per-
spective that mainly extrapolates current trends. We could then easily 
face an increase of gross final energy consumption to 125, identical to a 
25% increase over 2020. 
For the 2020 targets this would mean an increase of GHG emissions by 
18% and a share of RES of 27%, both far from the proposed targets for 
Austria. 
 
An EU 20 scenario A scenario for 2020 that would be compatible with the overall 20% EU 
reduction target (2020 EU 20) would keep gross final energy consumption 
at the same level as in 2005, i.e. at index value 100. 
Given the assumed amount of renewables of 34 this would require a re-
duction of GHG emissions by 15% which is within the range of expected 
reduction targets for Austria. The amount of renewables would match ex-
actly the share of 34%. 
 
Modification of the refer-
ence scenarios 
We coin these scenarios deliberately reference scenarios since they can 
serve as a basis for additional adjustments depending on the additional 
assumptions made. 
Higher levels of gross final energy consumption would not only require a 
higher volume of renewables but could soon become incompatible with 
GHG target. 
Additional compensating measures could be used for energy supply by 
lowering the use of fossil energy the corresponding transformation and 
distribution losses and switching to fossils with lower carbon content. 
 
Strategies for the transi-
tion to a low energy and 
low carbon economy 
Summarising we realise that meeting both the GHG and the RES target 
requires a fundamental transition of the current energy system toward a 
low energy and a low carbon economy. This is a list of relevant strategies: 
• Reduction of redundant energy services 
e.g. heating of unused rooms. 
• Increase of energy productivity in application technologies 
e.g. buildings with low energy or passive house standards. 
• Increase of transformation and distribution efficiency 
e.g. switching to high-efficiency cogeneration. 
• Switching to low and zero carbon energy sources 
e.g. renewable energy sources. 
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Figure 5: 2020 reference scenarios for Austria for gross final energy consumption 
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Source: Own calculations based on GAIN model 
 
2.4.3 Evidence of this dependency at EU-level 
 
The Commission’s as-
sessment of the relation-
ship between GHG and 
RES objective 
An analysis of the interactions of the two target at EU-level has been con-
ducted within the Commission’s Impact Assessment of the energy and 
climate package and is documented in the corresponding Annex to this 
(SEC(2008) 85, Vol. II). 
 
Stand-alone vs. com-
bined GHG and RES poli-
cies 
For this purpose a model-based assessment was conducted using the 
PRIMES/GAINS model. Thereby, besides a baseline projection three dif-
ferent cases were subject of investigation: 
• 20% RES achieved:  
It was assumed that the RES target is achieved in a cost-effective 
manner but without any specific policies for achieving the GHG 
commitment. 
• 20% GHG achieved:  
The GHG commitment of 20% is achieved in a cost effective manner 
but without any specific policies to achieve the RES target. 
• 20% RES and GHG achieved:  
Both the RES and the GHG commitment are achieved in a cost effec-
tive manner. 
Comparing the results of these scenarios aims to allow for the assess-
ment of the impact of both targets and policy instruments to achieve them 
as well as the impacts on each other. 
 
Impact on RES deploy-
ment and GHG emissions 
Table 8 lists the resulting RES deployment and CO2 as well as total GHG 
emission reduction according to this assessment.  
According to this analysis stand alone RES policies have a significant im-
pact on the reduction of GHG emissions. Conversely, stand-alone GHG 
policies do increase the RES deployment, even though the effect is less 
pronounced. RES policies alone will not be sufficient to meet GHG com-
mitments even if emissions are reduced by 10% compared to baseline. In 
a similar way, GHG reduction policies alone will not lead to an achieve-
ment of the RES targets.  
Obviously, only a combination of both GHG and RES policies is sufficient 
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for reaching both targets. It can be expected that combining these two 
policies is likely to cause a shift towards more energy-related CO2 reduc-
tions, compared to achieving the GHG target only. RES policies in combi-
nation with GHG policies will give additional incentives to deploy signifi-
cantly more RES on top of what would be done in a 'GHG policy only' 
case, and thus this leads to a higher reduction of CO2 emissions in the 
energy sector. 
 
Impact on costs The policy instruments to achieve the GHG and RES commitments do 
have an impact on each other. Putting a RES policy in place lowers the 
carbon price necessary to deliver the GHG reduction commitment.  
The assessed scenarios as illustrated in Table 8 require a carbon price of 
49 €/t CO2 to achieve the 20% GHG reduction commitment if no RES poli-
cies are put in place. If RES policies are introduced to achieve the RES 
target, a carbon price at 39 €/ t CO2 would lead to achieving the same 
GHG reduction target.  
Similarly, the RES incentive to achieve the 20% RES target lowers from 
56 €/MWh to 45 €/MWh with the application of GHG policies to achieve 
the GHG reduction commitment. 
 
 
Table 8: Impact of stand alone and combined GHG and RES policies at EU-level 
Energy-related 
CO2 emissions
Total GHG 
emissions
Baseline projections 12.5% 5.1% -1.5%
20% RES achieved 20.0% -5.8% -9.3%
20% GHG achieved 15.8% -15.8% -20.0%
20% RES and GHG achieved 20.0% -16.7% -20.0%
RES share in 
gross final energy 
consumption
Compared to 1990
Results on RES deplyoment 
and GHG reduction in 2020
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Box 1: Cap and trade – the conceptual foundations 
 "The aim of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is to help EU 
Member States achieve their commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in a cost-effective way. Allowing participating companies to 
buy or sell emission allowances means that emission cuts can be 
achieved at least cost." (Memo/08/35) 
 
Cap on emissions allow-
ances creates incentives 
for abatement and trade 
 
The EU ETS is designed as a cap and trade system, i.e. a quantified GHG 
emissions target is defined and translated into an amount of emissions 
allowances that is allocated to the participating sectors and installations 
via the National Allocation Plans. One allowance gives the holder the right 
to emit one ton of CO2e. Participants to the system are allowed to buy and 
sell these allowances according to their requirements (if their emissions 
exceed their allocation of allowances they can buy, if they hold excess 
allowances they can sell).  
The cap on the total number of allowances is supposed to create scarcity 
in the market and thus assign a price to GHG emissions. This price signal 
determines the polluters' decision whether to implement measures to re-
duce their emissions or to buy allowances when needed in order to mini-
mize their costs. Thus, the system gives an incentive to search for the 
cheapest abatement solution – providing for temporal and spatial flexibility 
– while maintaining the installations ability to pursue their activities. 
 
Equivalence with emis-
sions tax 
As the cap and trade system leads to the formation of a market price for 
GHG emissions it is comparable to the instrument of emission taxation. 
Both economic instruments use the price signal to affect the agents' be-
haviour.  
With a tax the administration makes an adjustment to market prices, which 
leads to an altered level of emissions. In contrast, with emissions trading a 
quantitative limit to emissions is set that leads to the formation of a market 
and a market price that reflects the stringency of the cap imposed. Thus, 
in the case of trading the environmental target is assured (as long as the 
price cap introduced via the penalty for non-fulfilment is not reached) but 
the resulting market price is insecure, while with taxes the price is fixed, 
but the resulting environmental effect cannot be predicted ex ante.  
In both cases, however, the regulated agents' decision is between main-
taining emissions and paying for them or to reduce emissions through 
various measures (e.g. fuel switching, improved use of equipment, new 
investments, reduced production) depending on which option is more cost 
efficient given current prices. 
 
The crucial role of in-
formation 
In order to assure a proper functioning of the system it is necessary that 
agents provide reliable and precise information.  
This includes the monitoring and recording of the emitted GHG for all 
regulated installations on the one hand and the registration of allowance 
allocations and transfers on the other hand. The regulating authority in 
turn has to decide when or how often to publish information on verified 
aggregate emission levels and target compliance.  
As has become obvious from the experiences from the first trading period 
of the EU ETS this information is highly relevant for the operation of the 
market and the formation of the respective price. 
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Mechanism for stabilis-
ing emissions price 
A pronounced volatility of the price of emissions allowances reduces pre-
dictability and planning security (e.g. investment decisions) for the regu-
lated agents. Prices that are too high pose a risk to economic competitive-
ness for firms especially if they are exposed to competition from outside 
the EU ETS. On the other hand, if the price is too low the incentive for 
abatement is reduced or even removed, thus compromising the credibility 
and effectiveness of the system. 
Therefore, a mechanism to stabilise the emissions price would increase 
security, avoid excessive compliance costs while preserving the abate-
ment incentive. A so-called safety valve could be introduced to the system, 
i.e. an offer from the regulatory authority to sell allowances at the de-
manded quantity when the market price reaches a predetermined level 
(ceiling price or price cap). If, in contrast, the price drops beneath a certain 
level (floor price) the authority could buy allowances.  
This design option in addition to the emission cap would thus deal with 
problems related to price-spikes (e.g. due to dramatic, temporary changes 
in circumstances) and highly volatile emissions prices. 
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Box 2: Linkage to other trading schemes 
Overview There are currently only a few links between different emissions trading 
schemes (ETS) and markets and they are mainly unilateral links. Linkage 
of the EU ETS with other comparable schemes is a strategic goal of Euro-
pean climate policy, but also the emerging schemes explicitly emphasize 
the aim of linking up to other schemes. 
 
Current and planned 
emissions trading 
schemes 
Current and planned ETSs vary significantly in size, the design character-
istics and geographical scopes. The EU ETS is by far the largest of the 
existing or planned schemes. Some emissions trading schemes are volun-
tary, while others are mandatory. Some ETSs are designed to be used for 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, while others are planned or in use in 
non-Kyoto Parties. Some of the existing or planned schemes cover direct 
emission sources, while others include electricity retailers or users. Also 
the compliance provisions show significant differences between the differ-
ent schemes. Differences also lie in the time period over which the system 
extends, as well as the time period over which emissions targets are set. 
Furthermore, there are also differences in the type and amounts of “offset” 
credits that are allowed.  
 
Economic implications Establishing an operational link between such schemes would create a 
greater diversity of sources and abatement options, leading to improved 
market liquidity and more efficient allocation of resources. In addition, link-
ing reduces price volatility. Furthermore, the inclusion of more participants 
might also prevent distortions of competition and counteract the threat of 
leakage by preventing entities from relocating their emissions to countries 
with less stringent or no emission reduction policies. 
 
Types of links:  
direct or indirect;  
unilateral or bilateral 
A link between various ETSs can be established in different ways: 
• Directly, by making the allowances from the different ETSs fully fun-
gible and valid for compliance in each ETS. Direct link can be unilat-
eral or bilateral. The Lieberman-Warner bill for example allows under 
certain conditions the use of EU carbon units (EU Amounts - EUA) up 
to a certain percentage. 
• Indirectly, by governments acting as mediators that receive allow-
ances from market actors wishing to make a transfer, convert them 
into Kyoto carbon units (Assigned Amount units – AAU), and transfer 
them to another government, which then converts them into their re-
spective system’s allowances or 
• Indirectly, by acceptance of common project mechanisms.  
 
Existing and emerging 
links 
A link of the EU ETS to the market for offset credits already exists via the 
linking directive (EC 2004). Also emerging ETSs aim at linkages to do-
mestic and international offset credits. Linking to offset credits may lower 
the cost of reducing GHGs and will help speed the deployment of clean 
technologies worldwide. Linking to or via offset markets can be an option 
where formal linkage between systems is not possible due either to sub-
stantive differences in design or political constraints 
 
Linking and Post-Kyoto Linking could help make emissions targets and trading more attractive for 
countries that currently have no Kyoto targets, or have refused to ratify the 
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Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore linking domestic and regional schemes may 
have a catalytic effect on international negotiations geared toward the fu-
ture of the international climate regime 
Given the state of international negotiations, linking may be the most fea-
sible way of achieving a truly global carbon market. This may be of great 
importance for the development of the future international climate regime, 
which can be based on a global carbon market as one of the main drivers. 
 
To whom will the EU link 
up? 
Bilateral linking of the EU-ETS with other schemes will not occur before 
2013 as the EU is busy with internal expansion and harmonization. 
The EU will want to  observe test periods of others with respect to  
• magnitude of allowance price difference, 
• comparability of stringency of caps and 
• similarity of the ambition level of climate change targets. 
Any differences in these criteria create a potential for conflicts. Only a few 
schemes, therefore, remain candidates for direct bilateral linking: Califor-
nia, New Zealand and possibly Australia. Much will depend however on 
the outcome of the Copenhagen agreement, and how stringent targets the 
different countries will agree on. 
Unilateral and indirect links, however, will emerge much earlier, well be-
fore 2012. 
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Box 3: Emissions trading schemes and price stabilisation 
Overview This is a brief survey of the emerging emissions trading schemes. In con-
trast to the current EU ETS and its proposed revision after 2012 almost all 
schemes include some kind of mechanism to stabilize the CO2 price. 
 
The New Zealand ETS New Zealand is in the process of implementing a domestic ETS. The plan 
is to bring in all sectors of the economy over a six-year period, starting 
with deforestation in 2008 and ending with agriculture in 2013. A New 
Zealand Unit (NZU) will be the primary domestic unit of trade. The scheme 
allows also the unlimited use of international Kyoto credits, with the excep-
tion of lCERs and tCER. NZUs are backed by AAUs. They are proposed 
to be auctioned in some sectors, such as the stationary energy sector and 
a proportion provided for free other sectors, such as for deforestation.  
Price stability 
As New Zealand plans to allow the unlimited use of international Kyoto 
credits, (CERs, ERUs and AAUs), the price of these credits will be a price 
cap for the NZ scheme. 
 
The US Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cooperative effort by 
ten US Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states to implement a regional cap-
and-trade system. RGGI represents the first mandatory GHG emissions 
trading scheme in the US. The system will begin operations in 2009. 
Emissions from fossil-fuel electricity generators larger than 25 MW are 
restricted under the cap with a goal of stabilising these emissions from 
2009 to 2014 and reducing them by 10% by 2019.  
Price stability 
Offsets thus serve as a safety valve to limit the costs of the scheme. Off-
sets are restricted to 3.3% of a generation unit’s emissions during an initial 
control period. If the12-month rolling average of allowance prices exceeds 
US $7 per ton, units may offset up to 5% of their emissions; if the 12-
month rolling average exceeds US$10 plants may offset up to 10% of 
emissions. In the event that up to 10% of emissions can be offset, partici-
pants may use credits from the EU ETS and from the flexible mechanisms 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Auctioning 
RGGI has set a reserve price, the minimum that a company can bid for an 
allowance, at $1.86. 
 
The Lieberman-Warner 
Climate Security Act 
 
Last year witnessed a dynamic increase in the number and viability of 
cap-and-trade bills introduced in the US senate. The Lieberman-Warner 
Climate Security Act is the most important of current proposals. The Act 
has the goal of capping 2012 US GHG emissions at or below current lev-
els and then declining annually through 2050. In the current configuration 
of the Act, 87% of U.S. GHG emissions would be covered by the cap. 
Price stability 
The bill would establish a Carbon Market Efficiency Board, which would 
be allowed to carry price stability measures, such as raising the limit on 
borrowing and expanding the limits on offsets. The scheme administrator 
would conduct a cost-containment auction. For 2012 the price would be 
limited to the range between $22 and $30. In each subsequent year, the 
price would be increased by 5% plus the rate of inflation. The bill also es-
 Synthesis Report 33 
 
WIFO-WegC & EEG 
tablishes a floor price for auctions at $10. It would be increased annually 
at the same rate as the cost-containment price. 
 
Australia The Australian government published in July a proposal for a 2010 emis-
sions trading scheme that would cover most sectors of the economy. It 
proposes to introduce a cap-and-trade scheme for all six greenhouse 
gases covered by the Kyoto protocol from 1 July 2010. Covered sectors 
will be stationary energy, transport, fugitive emissions, industrial proc-
esses, waste and forestry – the latter on a voluntary basis. 
Price stability 
In the first years the Australian scheme will also operate with a cap on the 
price of carbon, but this would be set well above the expected market 
price. 
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3 Design options for the ETS target 
 
3.1 Dealing with competitiveness and carbon leakage 
 
3.1.1 Concerns and causes 
 
The concern for carbon 
leakage 
Carbon leakage is a major issue in the design of phase three of the EU 
ETS. The current Commission proposal emphasizes the relevance of this 
issue by proposing to group the sectors most vulnerable to carbon leak-
age into a separate group with different rules for free allocations. Details 
are still left open and the Commission proposal suggests agreeing upon 
them by the end of June 2011. 
We attempt to contribute to the issue of competitiveness and carbon leak-
age by proposing an extension of the Commission proposal that fills this 
gap. 
 
Carbon leakage and 
competitiveness 
Starting point for our extended proposal is the understanding of carbon 
leakage as unwanted shifts of GHG emissions from ETS to Non-ETS 
countries. It needs to be investigated whether these shifts result from 
changes in the competitive position of installations caused by different 
exposures to carbon restrictions. 
 
3.1.2 Indicators for carbon leakage 
 
Conventional indicators 
for carbon leakage 
Conventional indicators for carbon leakage can be classified into the fol-
lowing groups of evidence: 
• Energy intensity 
Indicators based on the energy intensity of an installation or a sector 
may be defined either in physical units (energy per unit of output) or 
monetary units (energy costs per unit of output, share of energy cost 
in gross production value or production costs of a unit of output). 
• Cost impact of emissions allowances 
The cost impact of emissions allowances may be measured as a per-
centage increase of production costs caused by a one percent in-
crease of the price of emissions allowances (cost elasticity). 
• Demand impact of emissions allowances 
The impact of the carbon price on demand may be measured as the 
percentage change of product demand caused by a one percent in-
crease of the price of emissions allowances (demand elasticity). 
• Profit impact of emissions allowances 
The impact of the carbon price on profits takes into account in addi-
tion the ability of installations to pass through cost increases caused 
by the carbon price. 
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Deficiencies of conven-
tional indicators for car-
bon leakage 
The conventional indicators defined above suffer from a number of defi-
ciencies, above all limited relevance and applicability. For example indica-
tors based on energy intensity and costs do not capture market reactions 
and indicators measuring demand and profit impacts need a complex 
market analysis that is just not available for most products. 
This motivates a search for more operational indicators which are simple 
to collect and monitor and available both for sectors and installations. 
 
Indicators focusing on 
the competitive position 
We suggest therefore a set of indicators that describe the competitive po-
sition both as to existing installations and as to the investment decision of 
new production capacities. This motivates the following three types of in-
dicators: 
(1) Indicator for export competition to Non-ETS markets 
Export competition Existing installations are exposed to Non-ETS markets depending on their 
share of production that is exported to those markets.  
Example: An Austrian steel producer sells to Russia. 
• The share of exports to Non-ETS markets in total production is pro-
posed as an indicator for export competition. 
(2) Indicator for import competition on the ETS market 
Import competition 
 
Existing installations are exposed to import competition on the ETS mar-
ket from competitors outside of the ETS area.  
Example: A steel producer from India sells to the ETS market. 
• The share of imports from Non-ETS countries on the ETS market is 
proposed as an indicator for import competition. 
(3) Indicator for relocation competition of new production capacities 
Relocation competition New production capacities face relocation from ETS countries to Non-ETS 
countries if cost impacts from buying emissions allowances become rele-
vant. 
Example: A new installation or a capacity expansion for cement produc-
tion is considered both in Italy and North Africa. 
• Production cost differences for new installations between ETS and 
Non-ETS locations caused by carbon allowances are proposed as an 
indicator for relocation competition. 
 
3.2 Extending the Commission proposal for competi-
tiveness and carbon leakage 
 
3.2.1 Starting from the Commission proposal 
 
Dealing with three 
groups of sectors 
The current Commission proposal aims at an allocation mechanism based 
on auctioning. Potential competition and leakage problems are taken care 
of by allocating free allowances to sectors. Within this allocation proce-
dure three groups of sectors are distinguished: 
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• The power sector obtains no free allocations since this sector is ex-
pected to fully pass through the additional carbon costs, thus creating 
deliberately a price signal that provides incentives for higher energy 
efficiency in the use of electricity. 
• “Normal” sectors will obtain 80% free allowances in 2013; this per-
centage of free allowances declines over time and reaches zero in 
2020. 
• “Exposed” sectors may receive up to 100% free allowances. 
 
Open issues These design elements of the Commission proposal have opened discus-
sions about criteria that enable the classification of sectors into “normal” or 
“exposed “ and how to decide upon the amount of free allowances for the 
latter. Another issue is the timing of this decision since many stakeholders 
prefer an earlier finalization compared to the Commission plan. 
 
Operational procedures 
for competitiveness and 
carbon leakage 
We want to overcome the highly controversial distinction between “nor-
mal” and “exposed” sectors by extending the current Commission pro-
posal with additional allocation elements that avoid this either/or classifica-
tion. 
The additional allocation elements are based on our suggested indicators 
for export and import competition and relocation competition. 
The extended allocation procedure is fully in line with the Commission pro-
posal but attempts to fill the gaps for taking into account competitiveness 
and carbon leakage with a few additional elements in the allocation pro-
cedure that can be fairly easily implemented. 
 
3.2.2 Step 1: Overall ETS cap 
 
Path to a 21% reduction 
by 2020 
The overall ETS cap is determined for each year in trading phase 3 ac-
cording to the Commission proposal. 
The overall emission reduction target for the ETS sector amounts to 21% 
in 2020 compared to 2005 emissions.  
This is the procedure for the suggested allocation path from 2013 to 2020: 
• The overall cap for 2013 is determined by starting from average allo-
cated allowances in the period 2008 to 2012.  
• By subtracting 1.74% we obtain the available allowances for 2013.  
• This reduction factor of 1.74% is applied each year until 2020 ensur-
ing a linearly decreasing number of available allowances each year 
and resulting in the targeted 21% reduction of emissions in 2020. 
• For new entrants a reserve of 5% of the yearly amount of allowances 
is provided. 
 
3.2.3 Step 2: Free allowances 
 
 We suggest allocating free allocations to installations and sectors on three 
grounds: 
• compensating for export competition on Non-ETS markets 
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• compensating for import competition from Non-ETS countries on the 
ETS market 
• compensating for relocation competition for new installations 
We use a set of corresponding indicators to determine the amount of free 
allocations. 
(1) Free allowances for export competition on Non-ETS markets 
Export competition on 
Non-ETS markets 
Installations may opt-in for free allowances if their share of exports to Non-
ETS markets of their production is beyond a certain threshold (e.g. 3%). 
The amount of this share may be based on historical emissions and may 
be reduced gradually by a certain factor in order to provide an incentive 
for technological innovation. 
Alternatively this share of free allowances can be determined just by na-
tional export shares instead of exports of individual installations. 
Member States report the amount of free allowances granted for export 
competition to the ETS Carbon Authority. 
(2) Free allowances for import competition on ETS market 
Import competition on 
ETS markets 
The ETS Carbon Authority determines the share of imports stemming 
from Non-ETS countries for the various sectors and allocates a corre-
sponding number of free allowances to the sectors. A dynamic devalua-
tion factor may be applied. 
The total of free allowances for import competition is allocated to installa-
tions according to their share of historical emissions. 
(3) Free allowances for relocation competition 
Relocation competition For each sector free allowances may be issued because of cost differ-
ences for new production capacities between ETS and Non-ETS locations 
caused by the price for carbon allowances. Again a dynamic devaluation 
factor may be applied. 
The total of free allowances for relocation competition is allocated to in-
stallations according to their share of historical emissions. 
 
New entrants New entrants are eligible for free allocations out of the new entrants’ re-
serve. Basically the same principle for allocating free allowances should 
be applied as for existing installations to make sure that there is no dis-
crimination against incumbents. 
 
3.2.4 Step 3: Auctioned allowances 
 
 By subtracting from the overall ETS cap determined in Step 1 the amount 
of free allowances determined in Step 2 we obtain the amount of allow-
ances to be auctioned. 
Based on the share of historical emissions the overall volume of allow-
ances to be auctioned are allocated to Member States. This partition also 
serves for distributing the auctioning revenues. 
The auctioning procedure may be performed either by a coordinated ac-
38 EU Target Sharing 
WIFO-WegC & EEG 
tion of the Member States or by an EU Carbon Authority. 
 
3.2.5 Evaluating the extended allocation procedure 
 
 Figure 6 depicts the key elements of the extended allocation mechanism 
which mirrors competition on Non-ETS and ETS markets and competition 
for relocation of new installations. 
 
Figure 6: Extending the allocation for carbon leakage and competition  
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Source: Proposed extended allocation mechanism 
 
Benefits of the exten-
sions 
By filling the gaps in the Directive proposal with the suggested extensions 
the gaps in the Directive proposal with the extensions proposed we obtain 
a fully operational allocation mechanism that exhibits the following advan-
tages: 
• All sectors are dealt with symmetrically (power sector obtains no free 
allowances, no need to classify “exposed” and “normal” sectors). 
• Differences in export competition can be handled on installation level. 
• Modest additional information is required that can be fairly easily ob-
tained both for installations and sectors. 
• All allocation elements contained in the Directive proposal remain 
unchanged as reducing the share of free allowances over time. 
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4 Design options for the RES target 
 
4.1 Assessment of alternative designs for flexibility 
mechanisms 
 
Flexibility mechanisms 
for national RES target 
fulfilment 
With the Commission proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the use 
of renewable energy sources (COM (2008) 19) a new, more flexible policy 
design is being discussed by EU policy makers against the background of 
setting Member State targets for the year 2020. Following the Directive 
proposal the EU target is allocated to differentiated national targets based 
on a flat rate approach (same additional share for each country) modu-
lated by Member States’ GDP.  
As discussed in section 2.3.3 such an approach of target allocation does 
not reflect the resource availability of the countries and therefore does not 
allow for a least cost exploitation of the European potentials. Therefore 
several flexibility measures to better map targets and potentials are cur-
rently discussed. The subsequent section aims to offer an assessment of 
the key options in the current debate aiming to assure flexibility for target 
compliance via intensified cooperation between Member States. Conse-
quently, it takes the joint proposal of Germany, Poland and the United 
Kingdom on alternative flexibility mechanisms (DE/PL/UK, 2008a) as ba-
sis for further investigation. 
 
4.2 Statistical transfer between Member States 
 
4.2.1 Design 
 
Design Under a flexibility regime that builds on statistical transfer between Mem-
ber States, the state itself is in charge of trading. Any surplus of RES gen-
eration which is not needed for own target compliance could be qualified 
for such trade. The trading responsibility can be commissioned to accred-
ited agents, e.g. the support scheme operator, the transmission system 
operator, or – for GO purchase within a quota system – the quota obliged 
parties. The RES producers do not directly sell their production to another 
country for target compliance (they will continue to do so for the voluntary 
market and disclosure purposes, as in the current situation). They are 
solely supported by the domestic support scheme. 
 
4.2.2 Evaluation 
 
Pros These are the advantages of such a cooperation mechanism: 
• Exporting Member State maintains control of its target achievement. 
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• National RES support schemes are not directly affected by statistical 
transfer between Member States and can be tailored for meeting na-
tional RES policy objectives, e.g. the support of both low-cost and in-
novative technologies. 
• As advantage for Member States that act as seller appears that they 
can recover costs for supporting their domestic RES production and, 
besides, they may also benefit financially. 
• No technology specific regulation is needed as the Member State 
sells the RES technology mix it produced.  
• Large windfall profits (as expected in a technology-neutral private GO 
trade scheme or in a speculative market), which lead to high costs to 
consumers will be avoided. Obviously, this represents an advantage 
for possible importers, but also exporting countries may benefit due to 
lower support cost as needed otherwise (i.e. as competition between 
national RES policies is avoided). 
• For an exporting Member State it appears beneficial that the arising 
costs for system integration and secondary support can be reflected 
in the offer price. 
 
Cons These may be considered as disadvantages of such a flexible mechanism: 
• Potentially less market dynamic than under a private trade regime (as 
private RES producers have a less active role compared to private-
based trade) 
• Private project developers do not have an explicit incentive to look for 
the lowest-cost RES projects all over Europe since potentially pro-
jects with highest returns are not necessarily those with lowest-cost 
because of different regulatory environments in Member States. 
• RES development depends substantially on the national support 
scheme in place. Therefore, in countries offering low or ineffective 
support, comparatively cost-effective RES potentials would remain 
untapped, which could limit the overall cost-efficiency of RES support 
from the European perspective. 
 
4.2.3 Recommendations 
 
 Most of the recommended actions points are of general nature, but with 
impact on statistical transfer between Member States – aiming to facilitate 
its functionality and to ensure a certain RES supply on a Member State 
market.  
Introduction of measures for target compliance 
Enforcing compliance In order to stimulate RES development in all Member States and to facili-
tate the achievement of given RES targets, it appears beneficial to intro-
duce a transparent compliance mechanism at an early stage well before 
2020. Effective predetermined measures in the case of non-compliance – 
e.g. the establishment of a financial penalty (similar to the EU ETS com-
pliance mechanism) – would underline the mandatory character of the 
agreed targets and therefore support their implementation by attracting 
the necessary volume of private sector investment in technologies and 
projects. On the one hand, this would act as a safety valve for countries 
 Synthesis Report 41 
 
WIFO-WegC & EEG 
that consider it very difficult to reach their targets purely domestically by 
establishing a price ceiling for possible imports. On the other hand, this 
provides a clear price signal for possible exporting Member States (rich of 
RES potentials) to tap RES potentials not needed for own target compli-
ance. 
EU-wide platform for statistical transfer between Member States 
Enhancing market 
mechanisms 
In line with the Austrian proposal submitted to the Council working party 
on the RES Directive in July 2008 (BMWA/E-Control, 2008) an EU-wide 
trading platform, established by the European Commission or any other 
neutral EU institution would increase transparency and reduce transaction 
costs as arising in case of pure bilateral agreements between Member 
States. Besides, this would stimulate market dynamics – as all Member 
States are aware of demand and supply on the RES trading market. 
Removal of non-economic barriers 
Overcoming non-
economic barriers 
Of key relevance for achieving an accelerated RES deployment as 
needed for target compliance is the removal of non-economic barriers. 
The Commission should take an active role to overcome non-economic 
hindrances for an accelerated RES deployment as observable in several 
Member States at present. Consequently, the RES directive needs to in-
clude several measures assisting in this respect. Accordingly, the follow-
ing issues should be addressed: 
• Fair grid access for RES producers based on transparent rules. 
• Simplified, shortened permission processes with clear and binding 
deadlines. 
• Accelerated development of infrastructural prerequisites (i.e. required 
investments in transmission grid and interconnectors between Mem-
ber States are an important prerequisite for the integration of EU-
wide large-scale RES deployment). 
• In addition it should be considered that RES by definition need ade-
quate system integration for reaping future benefits arising from dis-
tributed generation. 
Removal of hindrances from other EU legislation 
Interacting with other 
EU legislation 
Potentially adverse interactions arise from interactions with other EU legis-
lation, e.g. water framework directive with impact on hydropower devel-
opment. Transparent and commonly applied rules for state aid are needed 
in order to avoid distortions in competition. 
Definition of minimum design criteria for RES support 
Minimum design criteria 
for RES support 
Policy action is required in all Member States to achieve the ambitious 
RES targets and to form a level playing field in the EU energy market in 
the long term. To contribute to this, the RES Directive should contain ade-
quate minimum design criteria for RES support schemes which need to be 
met by all Member States.  
The following criteria, independent of the support instrument applied in a 
certain country, are recommended: 
• The RES policy framework needs to respect the full basket of RES 
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technologies as allowed for target compliance. 
• An adequate level of financial support level should be provided – i.e. 
slightly higher than the marginal generation costs (in the case of a 
quota system the level of penalty is relevant). 
• Financial support for the operation of a RES plant needs to be guar-
anteed but clearly restricted to a certain time frame. 
• Any adaptation or change of the policy framework should be targeted 
to assure deployment of new RES capacities. 
 
4.3 Project based mechanisms (Joint Projects) 
 
4.3.1 Design 
 
Design Under the project based investment mechanism, a Member State that is 
not able to fulfil its RES target solely on a domestic basis would be allowed 
to financially support RES plants in another Member State and receive 
Guarantees of Origin in exchange for target compliance (the same basic 
mechanism as recently discussed for Guarantees of Origin trade between 
private actors). Such project-based investments could offer the possibility 
to access additional RES potentials in countries not interested (and not 
obliged) to develop these potentials themselves, e.g. – as often argued – 
some New Member States. It would also allow for a more active involve-
ment of private RES project developers. 
There are different options how to organize such joint projects. Importing 
countries can purchase the produced Guarantees of Origin through a gov-
ernment authority or allow the use of the support scheme of the importing 
country to financially support the RES plant. Regarding the export side, 
there are different alternatives for the exporting country to recover its 
costs: by retaining a certain Guarantees of Origin share for own target 
compliance, by adding export premiums on top of Guarantees of Origin, or 
by auctioning export rights, etc. 
 
4.3.2 Evaluation 
 
Pros Advantages of a project based mechanism comprise: 
• Joint projects increase the requested flexibility for Member States in 
achieving their national RES targets.  
• The mechanisms allow for technology specification of the RES sup-
port. However, it can be expected that they would mainly be used for 
low-cost technologies.  
• From the European perspective, an improved exploitation of the RES 
potentials could be achieved (where e.g. potentials, which are not 
needed by the host Member State to achieve its own target, would be 
tapped by importing Member State as long as they are more competi-
tive than their own. 
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Cons In contrast to above, project based mechanism might suffer from the fol-
lowing disadvantages: 
• Domestic support schemes might get under pressure due to possibly 
higher support offered abroad (creation of a “two class” support sys-
tem for RES projects). 
• Higher transaction costs occur compared to trade between Member 
States. 
• A delay of required investments in innovative RES technologies with 
higher costs may occur. Innovative RES options would most likely not 
be attractive for joint projects. They would still need to be supported 
by national support schemes, or might be delayed. 
 
4.3.3 Recommendations 
 
 The design of a project based mechanism should be motivated both by 
the overall objective aimed for and an incentive for Member States to pool 
the necessary administrative procedures.  
Overall objectives 
Relevant objectives When elaborating on the details on joint projects, the overall objective 
should be to define a system that 
• offers incentives for cooperation in reaching the RES targets, 
• reduces transaction costs or problems to make the RES projects 
bankable, 
• allows for benefits for both participating countries. 
(EU-wide) Pool for joint projects 
Pool for joint projects Following the Austrian proposal submitted to the Council working party on 
the RES Directive in July 2008 (BMWA/E-Control, 2008) the forming of an 
EU-wide pool for joint projects appears beneficial. The Commission should 
provide assistance in negotiating on commonly acceptable rules for joint 
projects. If several Member States jointly agree on them this would sim-
plify the administrative procedures and lower transaction costs. Besides, 
transparency would also be increased. 
 
 
4.4 Joint target compliance 
 
4.4.1 Design 
 
Design On a voluntary basis, two or more Member States may decide to combine 
their RES targets and pursue their target fulfilment jointly through joint sup-
port schemes. 
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4.4.2 Evaluation 
 
Pros Advantages of a joint target compliance include: 
• Member States combining their support schemes may benefit from 
the broader RES market and the resulting cost-effective resource al-
location.  
 
Cons Possible disadvantages of a joint target compliance comprise: 
• Achieving a (fair) sharing of the resulting costs and benefits repre-
sents possibly the most challenging act.  
• As long as RES target fulfilment remains in the responsibility of indi-
vidual Member States, achieving an agreement on how to account 
RES deployment may cause large administrative efforts.  
 
4.4.3 Recommendations 
 
 Concise recommendations on the novel cooperation mechanism joint tar-
get compliance conclude this section on design options for the RES target 
An ‘abstract’ option worth to establish with the RES Directive  
An ‘abstract’ option 
worth to establish  
This cooperation option appears ‘abstract’ for the time being. However, 
intensifying cooperation activities between Member States may let this 
option become important in the future. Consequently, it is recommended 
to keep this virtual mechanism included in the RES Directive.  
Clear rules for joint target compliance  
Rules for joint target 
compliance 
The fact that RES target fulfilment remains in the responsibility of individ-
ual Member States may cause high administrative efforts in case two or 
more countries are willing to combine their RES support scheme. The 
definition of, or at least the guidance on clear rules for a sharing of re-
sponsibilities between involved countries with respect to the target com-
pliance appears beneficial. 
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5 Positions for the negotiations 
 
 Based on the analysis we have presented above, we suggest considering 
the following positions for the final negotiations of the energy and climate 
package. 
We separate these suggestions into three areas: 
• Supporting domestic policy actions,  
• Extending the EU Emissions Trading System, and 
• Amending flexibility mechanism for national RES target fulfilment. 
 
5.1 Supporting domestic policy actions 
 
5.1.1 Advancing energy efficiency 
 
Comprehensive actions 
for advancing energy 
efficiency  
A major finding from investigating the impact of the targets for GHG emis-
sions and for renewables is the insight, that only a major increase of en-
ergy efficiency in all sectors and at all stages of the energy system is 
compatible with the 2020 targets for GHG emissions and renewables. 
A compatible – although given the current trends – unlikely scenario for 
2020 is the stabilization of final energy consumption at 2005 levels. This 
target could serve as a starting point for developing transition paths from 
the current status of the energy system to the 2020 target in so-called 
back-casting scenarios. 
 
5.1.2 Recycling auctioning revenues under the ETS 
 
Recycling of auctioning 
revenues into an Aus-
trian Carbon Trust  
Considerable revenues will become available to Member States from auc-
tioning of tradable emissions allowances. Instead of adding these reve-
nues just to the general federal budget, additional leverage could be given 
to these financial flows by using them for stimulating technological innova-
tions both in the ETS and Non-ETS sectors. 
There are a number of international examples for designing institutions 
that serve the development and diffusion of advanced technologies. An 
outstanding success for stimulating technological change in the context of 
energy and climate policy is the UK Carbon Trust which might serve as a 
role model for an Austrian Carbon Trust (ACT). 
 
5.1.3 Tradable emission allowances from domestic projects 
 
Allowances issued by 
Member States 
Article 24 of the EU ETS Directive contains guidelines for implementing 
measures for issuing allowances in respect of projects administered by 
Member States. 
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Given the urgent need to provide incentives for improving energy and 
emissions indicators in all sectors, this instrument should be considered 
as an additional tool where appropriate, e.g. for opening the market for 
energy service companies that specialize in commercial buildings (offices, 
shopping centres) and public sector buildings (hospitals, schools). 
 
5.1.4 Removal of non-economic barriers for the RES deployment 
 
Non-economic barriers The removal of non-economic barriers is of key relevance for achieving an 
accelerated RES deployment (as needed for target compliance). 
The Commission has to play a pro-active role to overcome non-economic 
deficits for an (accelerated) RES deployment as observable in several 
Member States at present. Consequently, the RES Directive needs to in-
clude several binding measures to address: 
• Fair grid access for RES producers based on transparent rules. 
• Simplified, shortened permission processes with clear and binding 
deadlines 
• Accelerated development of infrastructural prerequisites  
• Adequate system integration for distributed generation  
• Removal of hindrances arising from interactions with other EU legis-
lation  
 
5.1.5 Definition of minimum design criteria for RES support 
 
Minimum design criteria 
for RES support 
Policy action is required in all Member States to achieve the ambitious 
RES targets and to form a level playing field in the EU’s energy market in 
the long term. To contribute to this, the RES Directive should contain ade-
quate minimum design criteria for RES support schemes which need to be 
met by all Member States.  
In this respect we recommend the following criteria, independent of the 
support instrument applied in a certain country: 
• The RES policy framework needs to respect the full basket of RES 
technologies as allowed for target compliance 
• An adequate level of financial support level should be provided – i.e. 
slightly higher than the marginal generation costs (in the case of a 
quota system the level of penalty is relevant) 
• Financial support needs to be guaranteed but clearly restricted to a 
certain time frame (for the operation of a RES plant)  
• Any adaptation or change of the policy framework should be targeted 
to assure deployment of new RES capacities.  
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5.2 Extending the EU Emissions Trading System 
 
5.2.1 Implementing provisions for carbon leakage and  
competitiveness 
 
Operational procedure 
for dealing with carbon 
leakage 
As soon as possible provisions should be implemented that prevent car-
bon leakage and distortions in competition with non carbon-constraint 
countries. This will enable companies to prepare for phase three of EU 
ETS in time. 
We suggest an operational procedure how carbon leakage could be han-
dled in line with the current Commission proposal by considering readily 
available trade and cost indicators. These indicators are used for deter-
mining the amount of free allowances. 
Instead of dividing ETS sectors into three groups, as suggested in the cur-
rent Commission proposal, we consider a unified approach that can be 
applied to all sectors, but is flexible enough for taking into account differ-
ences among sectors and even installations. 
 
An extended EC proposal 
that takes into account 
carbon leakage 
Our suggestion for dealing with carbon leakage is based on the proposi-
tion that the EU ETS carbon price should not change the competitive posi-
tion of sectors or installations which may result in the relocation of produc-
tion activities. 
As an implementation of this proposition we suggest granting free allow-
ances to sectors and installations based on three grounds: 
• Compensating for export competition on Non-ETS countries  
based on exports of installations (or sectors) to these markets. 
• Compensating for import competition from Non-ETS countries to the 
market of ETS countries 
based on the corresponding imports.  
• Compensating for relocation competition for new production capaci-
ties 
based on the impact of carbon price on the choice of location for new 
installations 
These guidelines for granting free allocations are flexible enough for al-
lowing them to be applied to all sectors and installations. Similar reduction 
factors for free allowances can be applied over time as in the current 
Commission proposal. 
 
Simulation of this ex-
tended allocation proce-
dure 
We demonstrate in the appendix the applicability of this procedure for de-
termining the amount of free allowances and the implementation of the full 
allocation procedure by presenting simulations for the EU ETS disaggre-
gated into eight sectors. 
 
5.2.2 Empowering the carbon market 
 
Upper and lower limits We suggest empowering the carbon market, which is exposed to a wide 
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for carbon price move-
ments 
range of market failures that might result in volatile price movements.  
A key element for strengthening the credibility of the carbon market is a 
liquidity mechanism that limits price movements within a predefined 
range. This extension of the design of the cap and trade market would be 
fully compatible with most other emerging carbon markets. 
 
Extending the tasks of 
the Carbon Authority 
We denote as Carbon Authority the institutional setup that controls the 
supply side of the carbon market. In the current proposal this Carbon Au-
thority is the joint responsibility of the Commission and the Member 
States, both acting on relevant EU legislation. 
We suggest extending the tasks of the Carbon Authority by adding re-
sponsibility for maintaining the carbon price within the targeted price 
range. This is done by supplying the carbon market with adequate liquidity 
by  
• controlling amount and timing of supply of allowances via auctioning, 
• acting in the market as a buyer and seller of allowances, and 
• using the links to other carbon markets. 
 
Decoupling the Carbon 
Authority from policy 
interventions 
The Carbon Authority could be given even more credibility by framing an 
institutional environment that is less prone to policy interventions.  
It should be considered, therefore, to give the Carbon Authority the status 
of an agency that acts similar to a central bank. 
 
5.2.3 Designing the auctioning mechanism 
 
 Together with the allocation of free allowances the auctioning mechanism 
determines the supply of allowances on the carbon market. 
 
Auctions on EU level with 
revenues distributed to 
Member States 
Although revenues from auctioning remain under the authority of Member 
States it is not evident for them to organize also the auctioning procedure. 
We suggest, therefore, organizing auctions on EU level as a task of the 
Carbon Authority. 
This lowers transaction costs and makes auctions serve as an instrument 
for controlling the liquidity of the carbon market. 
Revenues from auctioning are to be distributed among Member States 
according to the current Commission proposal. 
 
5.2.4 Other allocation issues 
 
Small installations 
Different treatment of 
small installations 
71%of the smallest installations in the EU ETS account for not more than 
5% of the emissions cap. This reveals the large amount of small installa-
tions in the system. 
We support suggestions for small installations that offer an opt-out for an 
energy tax.  
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Emissions from industrial processes 
Compensating for emis-
sions from processes 
Emissions from industrial processes as in the production of steel or ce-
ment can by definition not be avoided. Costs from carbon allowances pro-
vide at least for current installations no technological incentives. 
Together with the guidelines of the ETS Directive that the ETS must not 
impose additional burdens for competition, we conclude that emissions 
from industrial processes should be considered for free allocations. 
 
 
5.3 Amending flexibility mechanism for national RES 
target fulfilment 
 
5.3.1 Improving statistical transfer between Member States 
Mechanism for target compliance 
Enforcement mechanism In order to stimulate RES development in all Member States and to facili-
tate the achievement of given RES targets, it appears beneficial to intro-
duce a transparent compliance mechanism at an early stage well before 
2020. An effective predetermined measure in the case of non-compliance 
– e.g. the establishment of a financial penalty (similar to the EU ETS com-
pliance mechanism) appears beneficial in several ways:  
• It underlines the mandatory character of the agreed targets and 
therefore supports their implementation by attracting the necessary 
volume of private sector investment in technologies and projects. 
• It acts as a safety valve for Member States that consider it very diffi-
cult to reach their targets purely domestically by establishing a price 
ceiling for possible imports.  
• It provides a clear price signal for possible exporting Member States 
(rich of RES potentials) to tap RES potentials not needed for own tar-
get compliance. 
EU-wide platform for statistical transfer between Member States 
Trading platform In line with (BMWA/E-Control, 2008) we recommend the establishment of 
an EU-wide trading platform to facilitate cooperation at Member States 
level. This would increase transparency, reduce transaction costs (as aris-
ing in case of pure bilateral agreements) and stimulate market dynamics. 
 
 
5.3.2 Improving project based mechanisms (Joint Projects) 
Overall objective 
Relevant objectives The overall objective should be to define a system that 
• offers incentives for cooperation in reaching the RES targets, 
• reduces transaction costs or problems to make the RES projects 
50 EU Target Sharing 
WIFO-WegC & EEG 
bankable,  
• allows for benefits for both participating countries. 
EU-wide pool for joint projects 
Pool for joint projects Following the Austrian proposal submitted to the Council working party on 
the RES Directive in July 2008 (BMWA/E-Control, 2008) the forming of an 
EU-wide pool for joint projects appears beneficial. The Commission 
should provide assistance in negotiating on commonly acceptable rules 
for joint projects. If several Member States jointly agree on them this 
would simplify the corresponding administrative procedures, lower trans-
action costs and increase transparency, 
 
5.3.3 Enhancing a joint target compliance 
An ‘abstract’ option worth to establish with the RES Directive  
An ‘abstract’ option 
worth to establish  
Member States combining their support schemes may benefit from the 
broader RES market and the resulting cost-effective resource allocation. 
This cooperation option appears ‘abstract’ for the time being. However, 
intensifying cooperation activities between Member States may make this 
option become important in the future. Consequently, it is recommended 
to keep this mechanism included in the RES Directive.  
Clear rules for joint target compliance  
Rules for joint target 
compliance 
The fact that RES target fulfilment remains in the responsibility of individ-
ual Member States may cause high administrative efforts in case two or 
more countries are willing to combine their RES support scheme. The 
definition of, or at least the guidance on clear rules for a sharing of re-
sponsibilities between involved countries with respect to the target com-
pliance appears beneficial. 
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Remembering and  
reconsidering carbon leakage 
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7 The seemingly elimination and potential 
re-emergence of carbon leakage in the 
energy and climate package 
Substantial innovations 
in the EU ETS 
The energy and climate package presented by the Commission on 
23 January 2008 contains a number of substantial innovations for the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme,  above all 
• an EU-wide emissions cap and 
• a reliance on auctioning as the main mechanism for allocating allow-
ances. 
 
The issue of carbon  
leakage 
Major controversies until the approval of the package by the European 
Council on 12 December 2008 centred around the issue of carbon leak-
age, the potential adverse impacts of the EU ETS on energy intensive 
industries and the related issue of allocating free allowances for compen-
sation. 
Compared to the Commission proposal, the final version of the package 
maintained the overall emissions cap, the 21 % reduction of emissions by 
2020 over 2005.  
However, the Council decision cut the volume of allowances that needs to 
undergo auctioning by approximately one third. In addition to derogations 
for the electricity sector in a few new Member States, according to esti-
mates by the Commission almost the whole industry sector will obtain free 
but capped allowances. This is motivated above all as a protection against 
carbon leakage. 
 
The shift from auctioning 
to free allowances 
It is this shift from full auctioning in the Commission proposal to almost 
complete free allowances for industry that has caused controversies about 
the efficiency and the effectiveness of the final version of the reformed EU 
ETS design. 
We call for a differentiated evaluation of the final version of the energy 
and climate package and summarize our findings in the following state-
ments: 
• The overall reduction target for installations that are subject to the EU 
ETS remains unchanged, i.e. emissions in the ETS sector need to be 
reduced by 21% in 2020 compared to 2005. This is in line with the 
20 % overall reduction target of all sectors and Member States for 
2020 compared to 1990. 
• The almost full free allocation of allowances to industry obviously 
eliminates the carbon leakage issue. Other, more sophisticated pro-
cedures for tackling this issue would have been available for protect-
ing the competitive position of industry with a lower need for free al-
lowances but these procedures have not become politically accept-
able. 
• The major impact of the reduction of the volume of allowances to be 
auctioned is on the revenues from auctioning but not on the carbon 
price. This statement rests on the assumption that the perception of 
abatement opportunities by participants in the carbon market is not 
changed by more generous free allocations. 
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• Increasing the volume of free allocations means that fewer installa-
tions will be exposed to the price signal of the carbon market and 
thus probably will obtain fewer incentives for technological change. 
This is definitely a drawback of a free allocations procedure. 
• The vast volume of free allowances for industry generates the need 
for sound procedures to allocate these allowances to installations on 
an EU-wide level. It is this stage of the allocation mechanism of the 
reformed EU ETS where additional incentives for technological 
change can be introduced by benchmarking procedures. Surpris-
ingly, information that was relevant for evaluating the exposure to 
carbon leakage returns again for creating benchmarking rules that 
are able to substitute price signals. 
 
 
8 Key elements of the final outcome  
 We summarize in this section briefly the key elements of the final outcome 
of the negotiations about the energy and climate package as to the reform 
the EU ETS. 
 
8.1 Shares of auctioning 
 
 As in the Commission proposal three sectors are distinguished for the 
shares of allowances to be auctioned: 
 
Electricity sector For the electricity sector the full auctioning rate of 100 % starts with 2013 
as suggested by the Commission. 
Exemptions, however, are added for Member States with a high share of 
coal and gas (Poland and Hungary). The auctioning rate for these coun-
tries starts at 30 % in 2013 and increases to 100 % in 2020. 
 
Industrial sectors not 
exposed to carbon leak-
age 
For the industrial sectors that are considered not exposed to carbon leak-
age the auctioning rate starts at 20 % in 2013 and reaches 70 % in 2020. 
In contrast the Commission proposed full auctioning already for 2020. Ac-
cording to preliminary estimates by the Commission not more than 4% of 
industrial sectors could remain in this category. 
 
Industrial sectors ex-
posed to carbon leakage 
Industrial sectors that are exposed to the risk of carbon leakage now 
dominate by far in the classification of industries that finally determine the 
shares of auctioning. 
Installations in sectors or sub-sectors which belong to this category will 
receive 100 % of allowances free of charge at the benchmark level of the 
best technology available. 
By the end of 2009 the Commission will decide on sectors and sub-
sectors that qualify as being exposed to the risk of carbon leakage ac-
cording to the following indicators: 
• The sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by costs for 
allowances would lead to an increase in production costs exceeding 
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5 % of Gross Value Added  
and  
the total value of exports and imports divided by the total value of its 
turnover and imports exceeds 10 %. 
• Alternatively, the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced 
by costs for allowances would lead to an increase in production costs 
exceeding 30 % of Gross Value Added 
or 
the total value of exports and imports divided by the total value of its 
turnover and imports exceeds 30 %. 
The level of disaggregation for calculating these indicators will be level 3 
NACE code or, where appropriate and where the relevant data are avail-
able, at level 4. 
The currently available documents do not indicate the assumptions made 
for the carbon price when cost impacts are calculated. This leaves con-
siderable uncertainty about the procedure for calculating the indicators for 
carbon leakage. 
 
 
8.2 Other provisions 
 
Allocation of revenues 
from auctioning 
The revenues from auctioning will be divided up as follows: 
• 88 % will be allocated between Member States in proportions identi-
cal to the verified emissions in 2005. 
• 10 % will be allocated to certain Member States in the interest of 
solidarity and growth. 
• 2 % will be allocated to Member States which had achieved in 2005 
at least a reduction of 20 % in greenhouse gas emissions compared 
with the reference year of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Funding for CCS tech-
nologies and renewable 
energy sources 
300 millions of emission allowances will be made available for innovative 
carbon capture and storage technologies and renewable energy sources. 
 
Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation 
3 % of verified 2005 emissions are the limit of the quantity of credits each 
Member State may use from the Clean Development Mechanism and 
Joint Implementation. 
Certain Member States, including Austria, will be able to use an additional 
1 % of verified 2005 emissions for credits from projects in least developed 
and small island developing states. 
 
Political statement con-
cerning the use of reve-
nues from auctioning 
In a political statement the European Council tied the use of revenues 
from auctioning to EU efforts for providing finance for actions to mitigate 
and adapt to climate change in the context of international agreements. 
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9 The evolution of the carbon leakage issue 
 Since the publication of the Commission documents for the energy and 
climate package the issue and understanding of carbon leakage has un-
dergone substantial changes. 
 
9.1 The search for operational indicators 
 
The temptation of the 
“exposed” sector 
The option in the Commission proposal for considering besides electricity 
and “normal” industries also an “exposed” sector created incentives for 
sub-sectors and installations to qualify for this sector since up to 100 % of 
free allowances were promised. 
 
Qualitative assessments 
of the risk of carbon 
leakage 
The Commission proposal stimulated a number of notes and papers nota-
bly the most important ones produced by Commission services.  
At a first stage the following qualitative assessments emerged as being 
relevant for considering a sector or sub-sector being exposed to negative 
impacts from a price for allowances: 
• the change in production costs, 
• the ability to pass-through these costs and 
• the trade intensity with Non-ETS countries with regard to both ex-
ports and imports. 
The total impact of participating in the EU ETS finally should show up in 
the change of profits. 
 
Non-operational  
indicators 
A number of difficulties have become visible when attempts were made to 
convert the proposed qualitative assessments into quantitative indicators. 
Rather soon it was realised that impacts of the carbon market on profits 
cannot be identified due to several other factors that make profits very 
volatile. 
Similarly path-through indicators turned out to be non operational because 
of the comprehensive market analysis that would be required. 
A number of additional qualitative indicators were identified as being worth 
considering but were also dismissed because of their limited quantitative 
applicability as, e.g. 
• the abatement potential of a sector or sub-sector, 
• transportation costs, 
• barriers to trade, 
• market structure and 
• price elasticities. 
 
Two operational meas-
ures 
Finally only two indicators emerged as being able of becoming operational 
measures for carbon leakage: 
• carbon cost intensity and 
• international trade intensity. 
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9.2 Measuring carbon cost intensity 
 
 Two types of indicators for measuring the carbon cost intensity can be 
defined. 
 
Value indicators of car-
bon cost intensity 
A value indicator relates the increase in carbon costs triggered by a given 
carbon price (e.g. € 20 per ton of CO2) to Gross Value Added (GVA). 
In addition a distinction can be made between the direct carbon costs 
caused by the amount of carbon attributed to the production activity and 
the indirect carbon cost attributed to the increase in electricity prices. 
This is the carbon cost indicator agreed upon in the energy and climate 
package for identifying sectors and sub-sectors exposed to the risk of car-
bon leakage. Surprisingly in the documents no carbon price is visible for 
calculating the carbon cost impacts. 
 
Quantity indicators of 
carbon cost intensity 
A quantity indicator relates the amount of carbon to a unit of Gross Value 
Added (GVA). 
This indicator was proposed by Germany in the final negotiations of the 
package but was not accepted. 
 
Table A.1: Carbon cost intensities for steel 
CITL UNFCCC
% %
Austria 12% 13%
Belgium 8% 10%
Bulgaria 91% 94%
Czech Republic 10% 23%
Denmark
Estonia
Finland 9% 9%
France 17% 13%
Germany 7% 14%
Greece 4% 4%
Hungary 15% 28%
Ireland
Italy 8% 6%
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland 11% 22%
Portugal 5% 5%
Romania 58% 37%
Slovakia
Slovenia 3% 4%
Spain 6% 8%
Sweden 5% 4%
United Kingdom 29% 31%
Relative carbon cost impact
 
Source: Own calculations based on CITL, UNFCCC and NACE. 
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Problems and  
deficiencies 
Table A.1 reveals substantial problems emerging from an international 
comparison. Obviously the fluctuations of this indicator among Member 
States highly question the usability of the numerical results obtained. 
This limited usability can be linked to different causes. One is the volatility 
of Gross Value Added with respect to product prices, profit margins and 
different accounting rules for capital costs. Another is the inhomogenity of 
the product that calls for further disaggregation. 
 
 
9.3 Measuring trade intensity 
 
Trade intensity as de-
fined in the package 
In the energy and climate package the indicator for measuring trade in-
tensity is defined as the total value of exports and imports divided by the 
total value of turnover and imports at sub-sectoral level. 
 
A more specific trade 
intensity 
A more specific indicator for trade intensity would take into account only 
export flows to and import flows from Non-ETS countries. 
It also makes sense to calculate separate trade intensities for exports and 
imports in order to get a better understanding of the relative importance of 
export and import competition. 
 
 
10 A set of indicators for the EU ETS 
 
Indicators for the EU ETS The Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO) maintains a com-
prehensive database of the EU ETS. Based on these data we present a 
set of trade and carbon cost intensity indicators for a breakdown of seven 
sectors we could identify in the EU ETS Community Independent Trans-
action Log (CITL). 
 
Cost intensity indicator For the carbon cost intensity indicator we rely on direct and indirect cost 
estimates for UK as presented in Hourcade et al. (2007). The cost effects 
are based on a € 20 per ton of CO2 carbon price. Figure A.1 depicts these 
carbon cost intensities with cement leading, followed by iron and steel. On 
this level of disaggregation almost all sectors have cost intensity indica-
tors beyond 5 % of Gross Value Added. 
 
Trade intensity indica-
tors 
Figure A.2 indicates the amount of import and export competition with 
Non-ETS countries for each sector defined as trade flows over the value 
of production. 
In addition the cost indicator is marked by colouring the marks of the trade 
indicators. 
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Figure A.1: Carbon cost intensities 
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Source: Own calculations based on Hourcade et al. (2007) 
 
Relating these indicators 
to the indicators in the 
package 
Figure A.2 enables a first judgement about the thresholds defined in the 
energy and climate package. Almost all sectors – at least on the level of 
disaggregation used – will pass both the carbon cost and trade intensity 
criterion. 
In addition we can identify sectors that show either an excessive carbon 
cost intensity, as cement, or an excessive trade intensity, as pulp and pa-
per. 
 
Figure A.2: Trade and Carbon cost intensities in the EU ETS 
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Source: Own calculations based on WIFO databases 
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11 Conclusions and suggestions 
 
 After having followed the discussion of carbon leakage since the publica-
tion of the Commission proposal for the energy and climate package until 
the final decision of the European Council we want to draw a few conclu-
sions and to make some suggestions. 
 
Reducing the risk of car-
bon leakage by free al-
lowances 
The risk of carbon leakage can be managed by allocating free allowances 
proportional to their risk of exposure. The following issues, however, 
should be considered: 
• Two indicators for identifying the risk of carbon leakage are essential, 
one taking into account the carbon cost intensity, the other the trade 
intensity. 
• A single indicator is not sufficient, since sectors or sub-sectors are 
vulnerable with respect to carbon leakage both because of increases 
of production cost and/or exposure in international trade. 
• International comparisons of the carbon cost intensity are rather diffi-
cult because of different accounting principles and inhomogeneous 
product categories. 
• A static analysis of carbon leakage based on one or a few years may 
not be valid for future judgments because of changes in the carbon 
markets and in the trade flows. 
 
Suggestions for a Carbon 
Market Monitoring pro-
cedure 
We suggest putting the issue of carbon leakage in the context of a com-
prehensive Carbon Market Monitoring (CMM) procedure which would take 
care of the following tasks: 
• Auctioning of allowances could be arranged by the Carbon Market 
Monitoring procedure on EU level and auctioning revenues distrib-
uted to Member States according to the agreed upon shares. 
• If necessary the Carbon Market Monitoring procedure may use the 
timing and the amount of allowances supplied for auctioning as in-
strument for stabilizing the carbon price. 
• In addition the Carbon Market Monitoring procedure could be re-
sponsible for allocating the free allowances to installations based on 
benchmarking criteria. 
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